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CHANGING THE RULES: PUBLIC ACCESS To DEPENDENCY
COURT
KATHLEEN S. BEAN*
Public access to American court proceedings is a metaphor for jus-
tice in America. Open courtrooms encourage truthfulness and discourage
perjury, they encourage fairness and discourage abuse, and most impor-
tant, they place our system of justice before the public and thus make it
accountable.' Open courtrooms, however, are not the norm for America's
system of juvenile justice. Since the creation of the juvenile court system
at the start of the twentieth century, the juvenile court has been largely
closed to the public. Closed proceedings fit with the early juvenile court
reformers' philosophy, which was not to punish, but to treat and reha-
bilitate children who had committed criminal acts. Closed proceedings
were seen as protecting children from the trauma of publicity, protecting
children from the stigma of being labeled delinquents, and accommo-
dating an informal setting, which was conducive to the parental role re-
formers envisioned for juvenile court judges.2 One hundred years later,
there is much debate about the wisdom of closed courtroom proceedings
for children who have committed criminal acts . As a result, juvenile
delinquency hearings have become more open to the public.4 There has
been limited debate, however, about the practice of the closed courtroom
for children in dependency proceedings, a group also subject to the juris-
diction of juvenile courts. Children who are abused or neglected and thus
in need of the protective services of the state are also subject to the
closed courtroom of the juvenile court system.5 The wisdom of closing
those child dependency hearings is the subject of this article.
* Professor of Law, University Distinguished Teaching Professor, Brandeis School of Law,
University of Louisville. I wish to thank my research assistants, Yuexin Li (Stephen) and Melissa
Ford, and the wonderful library faculty and staff, including Michael Whiteman and Scott Campbell.
I. Infra text accompanying notes 57-59.
2. Infra text accompanying notes 196-212.
3. E.g., C. Thomas Dienes, Access to Juvenile Proceedings, 13 COMM. LAW., Winter 7
(1996) (discussing the First Amendment right of access to juvenile proceedings); James F. Brelsford
& Rachel A. Silvers, Juvenile Courts: Part : The Battle for Access, 12 COMM. LAW., Summer 7
(1994) (discussing the ways courts strongly resist expanded media access and the potential
remedies); James F. Brelsford & Roger Myers, Juvenile Courts: Part I!: The Value of Access, 12
COMM. LAW., Fall 14 (1994) (focusing on media access to dependency hearings and related
governmental records).
4. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW DOCTRINE,
POLICY AND PRACTICE 1146-48 (2000) (some states have made proceedings and records more open
in juvenile delinquency court).
5. Statutes and court rules, of course, vary. However, most states have legislation mandating
closure with language such as the "general public shall be excluded," "the general public must be
excluded," the hearings "shall be closed to the general public," the hearings "shall exclude all
persons," or the hearings "shall be private." E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-65(a) (Supp. 2000); ALASKA
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The last two decades of debate about closed-door juvenile hearings
has concerned the court's delinquency population. Critics argued, and
continue to argue, that the juvenile court's rehabilitative philosophy,
including its closure and confidentiality, simply cover up a system that is
not working.6 In particular, critics charge that confidentiality conceals a
"too lenient" system that "coddles" and lets juveniles "get away" with
STAT. § 47.10.070(a) (Michie 2000); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-41(b) (Michie Supp. 1999);
IDAHO CODE § 16-1608(b) (Supp. 2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.070 (3) (Michie 1999); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4007(1) (West 1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 119, § 38 (West
1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.163(l)(c) (West Supp. 2001; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C: 14
(1994); ); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-20.B (Michie 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-24(5) (Supp.
1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7003-4.1.A.l(a) (West Supp. 2001); R.1. GEN. LAWS. § 14-1-30
(2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-755 (Law Co-op Supp. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-36
(Michie 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-115(1)(a) (Supp. 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, ch. 55, §
5523(c) (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1.302(C) (Michie 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.299(1)(a)
(West Supp. 2000); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-424(b) (Michie 1999). Any persons admitted in these
states must usually have a direct interest in the proceedings. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 16-1608(b) (Supp.
2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-1 15(l)(a) (Supp. 2000). Occasionally these mandatory statutes
provide that the judge may order otherwise, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7003-4.1 .A. I ( Supp. 2000);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-36 (1999), or that the hearing shall be open if the child "demand[s]
it." WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.299(1)(a) (Supp. 2000).
A number of states provide that the hearings "may" be private or closed or that the court
"may exclude" the public. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-325(i)(2) (Michie Supp. 1999); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 1063(a) (1999); KAN STAT. ANN. § 38-1552 (2000); MD. CODE ANN., Cts. & Jud.
Proc. § 3-812(f)(2) (Supp. 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.43(b) (West Supp. 2001); N.Y. JUD. LAW
§ 1043 (McKinney 1999). While this type of statutory language might suggest that hearings will
usually be open, too often the norm is closure. Doug Besharov addresses this in his Practice
Commentary to the New York statute: "On the basis of this section's wording, one might expect
court proceedings to be open to the public except in specific cases. However, in practice, the general
public is routinely and automatically excluded .... N.Y. JUD. LAW § 1043, Practice Commentary
123. Language in other state statutes suggests that closure is also the rule. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 432B.430 (Michie 2000) ("only those persons having a direct interest in the case... may be
admitted"); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-807(A) (West Supp. 2000) (the person "who is the subject
of an investigation" may ask for an open hearing and the court "shall order the hearing to be open to
the public" unless the court for good cause determines the hearing should be closed); LA.
CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. art. 661 (B) (West 1995) ("may admit any other person who has a proper
interest in the proceedings or the work of the court"). But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-801
(a)(b)(1999) (the court decides at its discretion, based on a list of factors, whether hearing will be
open or closed; "[n]o hearing ... shall be closed ... if the juvenile requests that it remain open.").
Only a very few state statutes or court rules affirmatively require or suggest hearings shall
be open. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.507(2) (West Supp. 2001) ("shall be open" but judge "may
close any hearing ... upon determining that the public interest or the welfare of the child is best
served by so doing."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.92 (West 2000) ("open to the public" but on motion
of any party or on court's own motion, court can close "if the court determines that the possibility of
damage or harm to the child outweighs the public's interest in having an open hearing"); Mich.
Rules of Court, R. 5.925 (2001) ("shall be open to the public," although court may close "during the
testimony of a child ... or victim to protect the welfare of either."); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-32-6-4
(Michie 1997) (if the court orders a proceeding closed, the court shall make findings concerning the
closure and "place the closure order in the file of the proceedings."); COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-
106 (Michie 1997) ("general public shall not be excluded unless the court determines that it is in the
best interest of the child or of the community to exclude the general public").
6. Dienes, supra note 3, at 7.
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little punishment for their crimes Further compounding the problem,
confidentiality also withholds knowledge from the public concerning
which juveniles are threats to public safety.' Because the system is not
working, argue the critics, neither is the rehabilitation of the delinquents.
The closed juvenile delinquency system, then, does "little more than
conceal the ... system's failures and abuses." 9
The same can be said of the dependency system - the closed door of
dependency court has too long concealed from the public a system that
leads to failure and abuse. Advocates for closed dependency courtrooms
can make arguments similar to those made in defense of closed delin-
quency courtrooms. While juvenile courtrooms were originally closed to
the public in order to contribute to the rehabilitation of delinquents, de-
pendency proceedings, like delinquency proceedings, are similarly meant
to protect the child and to treat the problem. The state seeks to rehabili-
tate and preserve the family if possible, not to punish anyone.' Advo-
cates can thus argue that open proceedings will inhibit this rehabilitation.
Open proceedings can subject children to invasions of privacy by the
press and public. Having one's family story told in public can embarrass,
humiliate, traumatize, stigmatize and thus delay the psychological heal-
ing that must take place." A closed hearing can contribute to an informal
atmosphere, making it more conducive to the social work approach that
might best heal and protect the child. Indeed, it is argued that the need
for confidentiality is more compelling for dependency hearings than it is
for delinquency hearings,'2 and when the issue is neglect or abuse, it is
hard to deny the appeal of protecting a child from the public gaze. Given
these considerations, closed hearings in dependency court certainly ap-
pear to be "in the best interest" of the affected child, a standard that re-
flects the overall charge to courts when dealing with neglected and
abused children." But there is fallacy in a rationale that considers only
the immediate and isolated effects of a closed or open hearing in a par-
ticular case. The cumulative effects of a dependency court system that is
presumptively and customarily closed to public access must also be con-
7. Michelle India Baird & Mina B. Samuels, Justice for Youth: The Betrayal of Childhood in
the United States, J. L. & POL'Y 177, 181 (1996); Danielle R. Oddo, Removing Confidentiality
Protections and the "Get Tough" Rhetoric: What Has Gone Wrong with the Juvenile Justice
System?, 18 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 105, 117-118 (1998) (Citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16
(1967)); WILLIAM AYERS, A KIND AND JUST PARENT: THE CHILDREN OF JUVENILE COURT 25
(1997); Fox Butterfield, States Revamping Laws on Juveniles as Felonies Soar, NEW YORK TIMES,
May 12, 1996, at 1).
8. Arthur R. Blum, Comment, Disclosing the Identities of Juvenile Felons: Introducing
Accountability to Juvenile Justice, 27 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 349, 368-69 (1996).
9. Id. at 370.
10. San Bernardino County Dep't. of Pub. Soc. Servs. v. Super. Ct., 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 339-
40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
11. See In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 449-51 (Ohio 1990).
12. in re T.R., 556 N.E.2d at 449-51.
13. See San Bernardino, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 340; Mary Mcdevitt Gofen, The Right of Access to
Child Custody and Dependency Cases, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 857, 861 (1995).
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sidered. These effects are visited upon all children in dependency court,
as all are subject to the court's justice. The current status of the depend-
ency court suggests that the presumptively closed courtroom has not re-
sulted in a system that serves the best interest of all children.
The health of dependency court is not good. Those who have tried
to stir interest in reform search for words to describe what they see. "Cri-
sis[,] shambles,"'' 4 "terrible plight,""5 "widespread frustration,"' 6 "so trou-
bled,"' 7 and, with much frequency, "failure,"' 8 are words used time and
again to try to communicate to the public the state of dependency court.
The reports of participants and others with some access confirm these
descriptions. Dependency court facilities are inadequate. Personnel are
underpaid, under-appreciated and under-trained. The caseload is massive.
The issues are serious and complex and at the same time, state and fed-
eral laws require courts to move quickly to determine a permanent home
for each child.' 9 Most telling, however, are the results of the system, the
stories of children harmed and more while under the jurisdiction of the
system charged with their protection. The frequent news stories of de-
pendency courts' child protective efforts gone deadly wrong are the easi-
est evidence to recite. Even closed courtroom doors cannot keep these
horrific stories from the media. In Georgia:
Once doctors concluded the child was a victim of battered child syn-
drome, records show that Miller [the chief of social work at the chil-
dren's hospital] hounded Fulton [Department of Family and Children
Services (DFACS)] not to return the child to the guardian. DFACS
went to court to remove the child but failed to subpoena Miller or the
doctors. On Feb. 10, 1995, a Fulton Juvenile Court judge returned the
child to the guardian without hearing any testimony from hospital
staff. By April 1996 Tavelle [the child] was dead. 2°
In Washington, D.C.:
On Dec. 22, [1999,] D.C. Superior Court Judge Evelyn E.D. Queen
ordered Brianna out of foster care and back to her biological mother,
who had been found neglectful of Brianna and her seven siblings
during a trial last year. Brianna died two weeks later in what was
ruled a homicide. D.C. police and a grand jury are investigating.
14. Jennifer R. Gavin, Child Welfare Law Curricula in Legal Education: Massachusetts'
Untried Opportunity, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 9, 10, 13 (1998).
15. Brelsford & Myers, supra note 3, at 14.
16. Sandra Anderson Garcia & Robert Batey, The Roles of Counsel for the Parents in Child
Dependency Court Proceedings, 22 GA. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (1988).
17. Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of the Adoption
and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 639 (1999).
18. Id.
19. Discussion infra, Parts III.B.
20. Jane 0. Hansen, DA takes up dead child's case; Ruled slaying in 1996, it languished, THE
ATLANTA JOURNAL - THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, May 9, 2000, at B 1.
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The attorney representing Brianna said the toddler's social worker
told him the mother's house was safe. The social worker denies that.
The social worker also hadn't turned in a report on time to Judge
21Queen urging that Brianna not be returned to her mother ....
In Florida:
Judge Lockett said Thursday he won't hear any more cases in which
DCF [the state Department of Children and Families (DCF)] investi-
gators are unprepared .... Lockett is the judge who sent Kayla back
to her home after getting incomplete information on her case from
DCF investigators. Later, after the child was slain, Lockett vowed he
22would never again send a child home without complete background.
We at least know part of what went wrong in Tavelle, Brianna and
Kayla's cases. A witness was not subpoenaed, a report was not timely
filed, and an investigation was not completed - all possibly deadly mis-
takes. In many cases we do not even know this much. In Indiana:
Eight-month-old Ashley Whetzel died, prosecutors allege, at the
hands of a man who had been hurting her much of her short life....
Exactly what happened ... is unclear - since Indiana law keeps child-
protection cases and their records secret, and many of the people in-
volved in the case would not talk about it.
23
In Missouri:
Eight-year-old Larry Bass weighed less than 30 pounds when he died
Wednesday .... Because case records are closed to the public, the
Missouri Division of Family Services would not release any details
24about the family's case or say whether it had investigated the family.
These stories, of course, are among the most notorious failures of
dependency court - children returned to the homes of their abusers, or
children abused by the foster families meant to protect them. But hun-
dreds of thousands of children are subjected to the dependency court21
process every year, in a system that can afford "no longer than five or
21. Sari Horwitz & Scott Higham, Record Numbers of D.C. Children Go to Foster Care;
Briana's Death 'Scared' Caseworkers, THE WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 28, 2000 at Al.
22. Karin Meadows & Frank Stanfield, Broken Safety Net Puts Kids in Danger; as DCF,
Bridges Go to War, Children are the Casualties, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 26, 1999, at Al.
23. Todd Murphy, Protective System on Trial With Father of Infant Who Died, COURIER-
JOURNAL (Louisville, KY), Oct. 17, 1995, at At.
24. Christine Vendel, Mother of Dead Boy Charged With Abuse Some Had Expressed
Concerns Children Were Neglected, KANSAS CITY STAR, Oct. 22, 1999, at Al.
25. Jane Waldfogel, Rethinking the Paradigm for Child Protection, in THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN: PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT 104, 104, 107 Figure 1 (Richard E.
Behrman, M.D. ed., 1998). Close to a half million children a day, for example, can be counted in
foster care. Gavin, supra note 14, at 10.
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10 minutes, 26 "about ten minutes, 27 or "an average of 16 minutes' 28 to
hear and decide a case. While closed doors keep unknown the specific
justice or injustice meted out in individual cases, most accounts of de-
pendency court do not inspire confidence. Most describe a system that
has learned simply to make do with its grossly inadequate resources, one
that focuses on processing cases at the expense of protecting children:
[H]eavy calendars . . . require cases to be moved through quickly.
There is no time for thorough and careful consideration of all the
facts and concerns. Giving too much time to any one case disrupts the
entire calendar. Neither the judges nor the attorneys can be com-
pletely familiar with these cases because of the number of cases
which they handle.... The caseloads maintained by most profession-
als working in these systems [are] too high to expect quality perform-
29
ance.
The children who are the subjects of these ten minute hearings in today's
dependency court, will, if they are lucky, never make the headlines of the
newspapers. But most assuredly, dependency court is failing many of
these children too.
The state of today's dependency court and the known failures of the
court require that we reconsider the wisdom of closed proceedings. First,
as a practical matter, to demand accountability from the delinquency
proceedings of juvenile court and not to do so with dependency pro-
ceedings is shortsighted. The two are linked. Personnel within the juve-
nile court system frequently comment that they expect to see many of the
children now in dependency court - abused, neglected or abandoned
children - "down the hall" in delinquency court a few years later.30 Their
26. Juvenile Court Improvement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means 105th Cong. 25, 28 (Feb. 27, 1997) (statement of Kathi L.
Grasso, American Bar Association Center on Children and the Law, on behalf of the American Bar
Association).
27. ABA Presidential Working Group on the Unmet Legal Needs of Children and Their
Families, America's Children at Risk: A National Agenda for Legal Action (Executive Summary),
reprinted in, 3 Ky. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS J. 18, 22 (1994).
28. Samuel Broderick Sokol, Comment, Trying Dependency Cases in Public: A First
Amendment Inquiry, 45 UCLA L. REV. 881, 913 n.232 (1998) (quoting Juvenile Servs. Comm. of
L.A. County Grand Jury, Legal Representation in Dependency Court 6 (1992)).
29. Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children and the
Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 118-19 (1997). See also Rebecca H. Heartz, Guardians
Ad Litem in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings: Clarifying the Rules to Improve Effectiveness, 27
FAM. L. Q. 327, 347 (1993).
30. Personal observations of author during two year stint as Court Appointed Special
Advocate (CASA). CASA is a well-known and respected example of an organization that trains and
coordinates lay volunteers to serve as guardian ad litems (GALs) in dependency proceedings,
sometimes alongside the child's lawyer. Mark Hardin, Responsibilities and Effectiveness of the
Juvenile Court in Handling Dependency Cases, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: THE JUVENILE
COURT 111, 113-20 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D. ed., 1996).
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suspicions are correct.' Children who end up in juvenile delinquency
court often enter the system of juvenile justice first as abused or ne-
glected children. That violence is a predictor of violence, and thus delin-
quency, is well known. That neglect is a predictor of delinquency, how-
ever, is also supported by research . Some researchers have concluded
that neglect, which constitutes the majority of dependency cases,33 "may
be more harmful to a child's emotional development than abuse," 3 and
that it is the combination of abuse and neglect that often produces "anti-
social behavior."35 Other factors are implicated, including sub-standard
housing, sub-standard health care, inadequate education, and there is a
36strong correlation between poverty and delinquency. Most indicators,
however, which appear to be linked with the child's earliest develop-
mental years, implicate family functioning including, most prominently,
abuse and neglect. 7 The impact is tangible. A child who is subject to
abuse or neglect, compared to a child who is not abused or neglected, has
"a 53% greater chance of being arrested as a juvenile, a 38% greater
chance of being arrested as an adult, and a 38% greater chance of being
arrested for a violent crime. 38 Protecting these children now from abuse
and neglect will pay off in the long run.
More fundamentally, however, to argue about access and account-
ability in the delinquency wing of juvenile court in the name of protect-
ing the public, without considering it in the dependency wing, is to rele-
gate to secondary status the protection of our nation's children. These
children are a part of the public that must be protected.
That the system is failing, of course, does not mean public access is
the answer, and it does not mean that public access will bring reform. It
is possible that a presumption of public access to dependency proceed-
ings would not have made a difference in the quality of the court's ef-
forts in the cases of Tavelle, Brianna, Kayla, Ashley, or Larry, for exam-
ple, or in many of the thousands of other cases dependency courts hear.
But it seems likely that it would have. Further, if children are dying be-
cause of careless mistakes; if courts are consistently deciding in ten min-
ute hearings to take children from parents, or to leave children with par-
ents accused of neglect or abuse; if all of this is going on behind closed
doors; and if, as Chief Justice Burger writes, "the presumptive openness
3 1. See Jane Watson, Crime and Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Policy: Time For Early
Childhood Intervention, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 245, 246-47 (1995).
32. Id. at 247.
33. Diana J. English, The Extent and Consequences of Child Maltreatment, 8 THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN: PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT 39, 43-46 (1998).
34. Watson, supra note 31, at 247.
35. Id.
36. Candace Zierdt, The Little Engine That Arrived at the Wrong Station: How to Get Juvenile
Justice Back on the Right Track, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 401,426 (1999).
37. Id. at 426-27; see also Watson, supra note 31, at 246-47.
38. Watson, supra note 31, at 247.
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of the trial" has long been regarded as "'one of the essential qualities of a
court of justice, ' '39 why do we continue to deny public access to depend-
ency proceedings as a matter of course? The public needs to see the
inadequate system of justice dependency court offers to its children.
Whether that opportunity for public accountability will bring reform and
a greater measure of justice for the children of dependency court remains
to be seen. But the case for creating the possibility is a persuasive one.
I. HISTORY AND FUNCTION
While I argue that public access to dependency proceedings should
be legislated because it is in the best interest of children and not because
it may be constitutionally required,n° the Supreme Court's constitutional
analysis in court access cases is a good starting point. In a series of
opinions in the 1980s, the Court recognized the public's First Amend-
ment right of access to criminal proceedings, beginning with Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia4' and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court2 (trials) and continuing with Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court3 (hereinafter Press Enterprise I) (jury selection process) and
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court" (hereinafter Press-Enterprise II)
(preliminary hearings). In each case, the Court relied upon a two-fold
analysis, looking first at the history of access to the proceeding and sec-
ond, at the function served by access to the particular proceeding. 5 The
Court's analysis suits a policy discussion in two respects. First, the
Court's analytical framework informs the discussion in two essential
areas: (1) reviewing the history of access to dependency proceedings
provides an opportunity to look at society's judgment about access to
proceedings over time and (2) examining the functional role of access to
dependency proceedings provides an opportunity to consider the logic of
open proceedings today. In addition, however, the Supreme Court's
analysis in these cases also contributes substantively to a discussion of
dependency proceedings. While the cases in which the Court considered
access questions all involved criminal proceedings,4 6 the Court's analysis
39. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 555, 567 (1980) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Daubney v. Cooper, 10 B. & C. 237, 240, 109 Eng. Rep. 438, 440 (K.B. 1829)).
40. Some state courts have dealt with the constitutional aspects of access to dependency
courts. San Bernardino County Dep't. of Pub. Soc. Servs. v. Super. Ct., 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 339 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991); Natural Parents of J.B. v. Fla. Dept. of Children & Soc. Servs., 780 So. 2d 6, 9 (Fla.
2001).
41. 448 U.S. 555, 575-581 (1980) (plurality opinion); Id. at 597-98 (Brennan, J., concurring).
42. 457 U.S. 596, 604-06 (1982).
43. 464 U.S. 501, 505-10 (1984).
44. 478 U.S. 1, 10-13 (1986).
45. See also Waller v. Ga., 467 U.S. 39, 46-47 (1984) (using the same analysis as the First
Amendment access cases, held that a closed suppression hearing, over defendant's objection,
violated defendant's Sixth Amendment rights).
46. The Supreme Court has thus far explicitly recognized a right of access only in criminal
cases. But see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) ("[W]e note that
[Vol. 79:1
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includes the history and function of access to courtrooms generally, thus
also providing an introduction to these aspects of dependency proceed-
ings.
The Court's opinions first consider the history of courtroom access
in America. 7 In Justice Brennan's words, "a tradition of accessibility
implies the favorable judgment of experience." 8 In other words, our his-
torical experience tells us something about how we have valued access.
Chief Justice Burger provides the foundational history lesson in the
Court's plurality opinion in Richmond.4 9 His discussion gives more focus
to the criminal trial, the issue before the Court, but also tells the history
of trials generally in the Anglo-American justice system, and makes
plain that not only criminal, but also civil trials have traditionally been
open. In tracking the open trial from England to America, Justice Burger
begins "before the Norman Conquest [when] cases in England were gen-
erally brought before moots, such as the local court of the hundred or the
county court, which were attended by the freemen of the community."'
These were courts of general jurisdiction and heard both civil and crimi-
nal matters.' Justice Burger's discussion moves on to another court of
general jurisdiction, "the Eyre of Kent, a general court held in 1313-
1314, [which] evince[d] a recognition of the importance of public atten-
dance apart from the 'jury duty' aspect." 2 From the Eyre of Kent, Justice
Burger takes us to the colonies:
historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open."); Richmond, 448 U.S. at
599 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give the press and
the public a right of access to trials themselves, civil as well as criminal."); Gannett Co., Inc. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 384 (1979) (observing that history demonstrates a "common-law rule of
open civil and criminal proceedings").
Lower courts, however, have relied upon Richmond, Globe and subsequent cases and
found that the right of access extends to civil cases also. NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Super.
Court, 980 P.2d 337, 359 (Cal. 1999); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir.
1984); In re Cont. Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984); Newman v. Graddick, 696
F.2d 796, 801 (11 th Cir. 1983); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177-
79 (6th Cir. 1983). A few authors have also argued that the public may well have a constitutional
right of access to dependency proceedings. E.g., Jeanne L. Nowaczewski, Comment, The First
Amendment Right of Access to Civil Trials After Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 51 U. CHI.
L. REV. 286, 306-10; Sokol, supra note 28, at 881; Brelsford & Myers, supra note 3, at 14; Gofen,
supra note 13, at 857.
47. The historical analysis the Court uses can serve two objectives. First, a history of access
can suggest a constitutional right. Important to a policy analysis, however, is the second objective,
what our experience tells us about the value of access. Nowaczewski, supra note 46, at 290-91.
48. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 556.
50. Id. at 565 (citing Pollock, English Law Before the Norman Conquest, I SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AM. LEGAL HIST. 88,89 (1907)).
51. Nowaczewski, supra note 46, at 294. Nowaczewski also notes both criminal and civil
trials were open in England and that there was originally no significant distinction between the two.
As the two became more distinct, public access remained constant. "[Elarly commentators either
expressly or implicitly regarded civil trials as necessarily open to the public." Id. at 295.
52. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 566.
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[W]hen in the mid-1600's the Virginia Assembly felt that the respect
due the courts was 'by the clamorous unmannerlyness of the people
lost, and order, gravity and decoram which should manifest the
authority of a court in the court it selfe neglected,' the response was
not to restrict the openness of the trials to the public, but instead to
prescribe rules for the conduct of those attending them.53
And in a footnote, Chief Justice Burger notes that "historically both civil
and criminal trials have been presumptively open. '' 4
Justice Burger then turns to the second part of the Court's analysis,
asking what function is served, what values are gained, by public access
to trials.55 And again, while the Chief Justice looks specifically at the
function public access serves in criminal trials, his rationale extends to
civil proceedings.56 Presumptive openness, Justice Burger observes, has
"long been recognized as an indispensable attribute of an Anglo-
American trial. 57 Hale in the 17th Century, Blackstone in the 18th cen-
tury, and Bentham in the 19th century all recognized the value of the
open trial.5  Among those benefits accruing from access Burger discusses
were giving assurance of fair proceedings, discouraging perjury, discour-
aging other misconduct, enhancing the performance of participants, pro-
tecting the judge from "imputations of dishonesty," discouraging deci-
sions based on "secret bias or partiality," educating the public, and en-
couraging public confidence in the system.59
The Court's discussions on the history and the functional role of
access suggest dependency proceedings should be subject to public ac-
cess. First, history has valued highly public access to trials, and depend-
ency hearings are trials. The dependency court adjudicates. Further, the
matters adjudicated in dependency court are no less worthy or needful of
the benefits access brings - fair proceedings, truthfulness, credibility, an
educated public, public confidence in the system - than are the matters
adjudicated in criminal court. Dependency courts decide whether a child
53. Id. at 567 (internal source omitted).
54. Id. at 580 n.17. See also Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 387 (1979):
For many centuries, both civil and criminal trials have traditionally been open to the
public .... [And] in the American Colonies ... [firom the beginning, the norm was open
trials .... Indeed, many of the advantages of public criminal trials are equally applicable
in the civil trial context. While the operation of the judicial process in civil cases is often
of interest only to the parties in the litigation, this is not always the case [citations
omitted]. Thus, in some civil cases the public interest in access, and the salutary effect of
publicity, may be as strong as, or stronger than, in most criminal cases.
55. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 575-78, 580.
56. Id. at 569.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 569, 572. These iatter observations served as the basis for the "function" prong of
the Court's history and function analysis. See also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596,
606 (1982) (listing the benefits of public access to criminal trials).
60. In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 458 (Ohio 1990) (Douglas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
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has been abused or neglected; they determine whether a child needs the
intervention of the state for protection; they decide the parents' rights to
the custody of their children; they separate children and parents; they
place children in foster homes. If preliminary hearings and voir dires in
criminal cases are, as the Supreme Court has said, as important as the
trial itself,6' and thus subject to public access, then a dependency pro-
ceeding, which is the "trial," should be as well.62
The Supreme Court has also recognized that access to proceedings
is even more critical when no jury participates and the judge acts as both
61fact finder and decision maker, as is the case in dependency hearings.
The Court's statement concerning preliminary hearings applies equally to
other proceedings conducted without juries: "[T]he absence of a jury,
long recognized as 'an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the complaint [sic], biased, or eccen-
tric judge,' makes the importance of public access ... even more signifi-
cant."
Thus, the Supreme Court's general discussion of the history and
function of access supports the wisdom of public access to dependency
trials. Justice Brennan, in Richmond, however, cautions against generali-
ties, and rightly so. Just as the protection of the First Amendment can
theoretically be made "endless" by asserting that an action informs the
65public and thus should be protected, we need to be cautious in a policy
analysis of access to court proceedings. A policy analysis, like a consti-
tutional analysis, "is not advanced by rhetorical statements that all in-
formation bears upon public issues; what is crucial in individual cases is
whether access to a particular government process is important in terms
of that very process." 66 Here, trials that they are, one cannot ignore a one
hundred year history that has treated America's juvenile proceedings,
including dependency, differently, and treated them so for particular
policy reasons. Accordingly, it makes sense to examine specifically the
history of dependency court proceedings to see if it reveals any "judg-
61. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 12 (1986) (quoting San Jose Mercury News
v. Mun. Court, 638 P.2d 655, 663 (Cal. 1982)).
62. The Supreme Court has described the role of preliminary hearings in criminal matters as
"often the final and most important step" and often the "sole occasion for public observation of the
... system." Press Enterprise Co. 478 U.S. at 12. Federal and state courts have extended the
Richmond right of criminal trial access to numerous types of legal proceedings, including bail
hearings, change of venue hearings, chambers conferences, and closure proceedings, by interpreting
"trial" broadly. Eugene Cerruti, "Dancing in the Courthouse": The First Amendment Right of
Access Opens a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237, 266-67 (1995).
63. Juries are sometimes involved in termination of parental rights cases. See e.g., WIS. STAT.
§ 48.31(2) (West Supp. 2000). However, judges almost always decide abuse and neglect dependency
proceedings. See Gofen. supra note 13, at 857; Sokol, supra note 28, at 917-18. But see COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-3-202 (2000) (providing for a right to jury trial).
64. Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 12-13 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156
(1968)).
65. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 555. 588 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).
66. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 589.
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ment of experience." Likewise, we need to analyze specifically the na-
ture of dependency proceedings to determine if the function of access is
important in terms of that particular process.
II. THE HISTORICAL JUDGMENT OF JUVENILE DEPENDENCY
PROCEEDING
While our country's modem dependency proceeding, with its confi-
dentiality strictures, is directly traceable to the invention of the juvenile
court in 1900, its earlier origins are legitimately traced to English laws
and judicial proceedings as far back as the 1300s. 6' These early statutes
and proceedings show that confidentiality was initially not a concern, but
then, neither was protection of children. Both concepts came later. The
historical starting point includes England's Poor Laws and to a lesser
extent, the English Court of Chancery's recognition of parens patriae in
cases concerning children.
A. England's Poor Laws
Modern dependency proceedings are probably most frequently traced
68to the English Poor Laws. The Poor Laws were England's legal mecha-
nism for dealing with its poor in the 1300s through the 1800s. 69 Begin-
ning with the Statutes of Laborers of 1349 and 135070 and leading up to
the Poor Law Act of 1601,71 the Poor Laws sought to deal with several
economic and social issues that involved the poor and adversely affected
the rich and middle classes . Certainly the earliest legislation was not
motivated by a desire to aid the poor or to protect dependent children.
The Statutes of Laborers, frequently cited as the beginning of the Poor
67. Some would argue earlier. See William P. Quigley, Five Hundred Years of English Poor
Laws, 1349-1834: Regulating the Working and Nonworking Poor, 30 AKRON L. REV. 73, 73 n.3
(1996).
68. Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patraie: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L.
REV. 205,210-11 (1971).
69. Id. at 210; William P. Quigley, Backwards Into the Future: How Welfare Changes in the
Millenium Resemble English Poor Laws of the Middle Ages, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 101, 102-03
(1998); Quigley, supra note 67, at 125.
70. The Statute of Labourers, 1349, 23 Edw. 3 (Eng.) and A Statute of Laborers, 1350, 25
Edw. 3 (Eng.), reprinted in I The Statutes at Large 248-253 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763).
71. An Act for the Relief of the Poor, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 2 (Eng.), reprinted in II THE
STATUTES AT LARGE 702-05 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763). The exact span of the Poor Laws varies
from author to author, but the 1601 law is usually seen as the high mark. See Jacabus TenBroek,
California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, 16 STAN. L.
REV. 257, 258 (1964).
72. For example, the early acts forced the poor to work for fixed wages; the later acts provided
some means of relief for the "impotent" poor. Rendleman, supra note 68, at 210-11; Quigley, supra
note 69, at 102-03. Much of the need for the Poor Laws was triggered by the decline and breakup of
the system of feudalism and the resulting social and economic changes. The black plague, famine
and the resulting labor shortage, along with various other factors, also contributed. Quigley, supra
note 67, at 73, 77, 82-83; Rendleman, supra note 68, at 210; Quigley, supra note 69, at 102.
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Laws,73 were designed to accomplish two goals: to keep scarce workers
from taking advantage of their position in the labor market by demanding
excessive wages, and further, to deal with those poor who would rather
live by begging than live by working - a situation becoming increasingly
disturbing to the public . The statutes dealt with these concerns by first
keeping the wages of the working poor in check; in effect, the laws es-
tablished maximum wages. Second, these maximum wages were cou-
pled with forced labor of the able-bodied poor, who "shall be bound to
serve him that doth require him, or else committed to [prison]."76 Finally,
as added insurance for the labor pool, and as a way to eliminate the
scourge of idleness, vagrancy and begging, the public was prohibited
from almsgiving to those "able to labour.,
77
By the 1500s, economic and political changes had resulted in a large
number of poor and homeless in England, 7  resulting in significant eco-
nomic strain and social disorder,79 and, consequently, in a 1535 Poor Law
that established a system of public relief.80 Once the public assumed the
burden of supporting the poor, it also felt the price tag, and one way of
keeping the price as low as possible was to put poor children to work,
either as indentured servants or apprentices. Under the Elizabethan Stat-
73. TenBroek, supra note 71, at 261; Quigley, supra note 67, at 82 n.50.
74. See generally A.L. Beier, MASTERLESS MEN: THE VAGRANCY PROBLEM IN ENGLAND
1560-1640, 1-13 (1985).
First, they were poor, lacking any regular income apart from wages from casual labor.
Secondly, they were able-bodied - 'sturdy', 'valiant' and fit to work. Thirdly, they were
unemployed, or in contemporary terms 'masterless' and 'idle'. Fourthly, they were
rootless,: wandering, vagrant. 'runnagate' [sic]. Finally, they were lawless, dangerous,
and suspected of spreading vice and corruption .... [Laws against vagrancy] reflected a
conviction of the ruling elites that vagabondage was a hydra-headed monster poised to
destroy the state and social order, for of the vagrant's five characteristics the leitmotiv
that ran through them all was disorder.
Id. at 4. See also Quigley, supra note 67, at 83-84 (discussing the birth of the Poor Laws pursuant to
the Black Plague); TenBroek, supra note 71, at 270-71 (describing the rise of the Poor Laws in
response to the English labor shortage): The Statute of Labourers. 1349, 23 Edw. 3 (Eng.). reprinted
in I The Statutes at Large 248-49 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763).
75. Quigley, supra note 67, at 84-91 (a labor shortage was causing workers to demand
"excessive" wages).
76. The Statute of Labourers, 1349, 23 Edw. 3, ch. I (Eng.), reprinted in I The Statutes at
Large 249 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763). See also Quigley, supra note 69, at 102 (laws establishing
maximum wages).
77. The Statute of Labourers, 1349, 23 Edw. 3, ch. 7 (Eng.), reprinted in I The Statutes at
Large 250 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763). See also Quigley, supra note 67, at 87 (delineating who was
eligible for alms giving). The 1349 statute gave some nod to "helping" the poor by requiring that
some necessities be sold at "reasonable prices." The Statute of Labourers, 1349, 23 Edw. 3, ch. 6
(Eng.), reprinted in I The Statutes at Large 250 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763).
78. Thirteen to twenty percent of the population in the 1520s was destitute, and the number
continued to rise throughout the 1500s. Quigley, supra note 67, at 92-93.
79. Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role
in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 894-95 (1975).
80. Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law, 43 CAL. L.
REV. 175, 180 (1955).
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utes of Artificers of 1562,"1 children as young as one year and up to age
twenty could be involuntarily apprenticed as workers for "seven years at
the least. 82 In theory, "apprenticeship involved training [in] the master's
'craft, mystery, or occupation .... ,,,3 Indenture, on the other hand, was
"simply a work contract. '" "In practice, both usually involved little
training," '85 and both involved separating the child from its parents, as the
child was required to live with the master for whom the apprenticed or
indentured child worked.86 Putting children "to service" reduced the drain
on the public purse and as a further benefit, kept them off the streets, a
particular concern of the Crown's at the time.87 The homeless of these
years were called a "new class of poor, the wandering ones,"88 triggered
by the large number of "wandering, vagrant, [and] 'runnagate' [sic]" per-
sons8 9 "terroriz[ing] town and country. ' 9°
The next major legislation in the succession of Poor Laws was the
Act of 1601. While England continued to revise its laws concerning the
poor after this date, the 1601 legislation is the trademark of the English
81. An Act Containing Divers Orders for Artificers, Labourers, Servants of Husbandry &
Apprentices (Statute of Artificers), 1562, 5 Eliz., ch. 4 (Eng.), reprinted in 1H The Statutes at Large
535-43 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763). See e.g., Rendleman, supra note 68, at 210 (referring to it as the
Statutes of Artificers).
82. An Act Containing Divers Orders for Artificers, Labourers, Servants of Husbandry &
Apprentices (Statute of Artificers), 1562, 5 Eliz., ch. 4, § 27, 35, 43 (Eng.), reprinted in H The
Statutes at Large 540, 541, 542 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763). See also Quigley, supra note 69, at 103
(children one years old to twenty years old were eligible for apprenticeship); TenBroek, supra note
71, at 274, 279-82 (defining the apprenticeship).




86. Id. at 895-96. While the training extended to many children was probably minimal or non-
existent, some surely did acquire skills they would not have otherwise had. Id. at 896 n.43. Further,
child labor "in this pre-child labor law era" was not untoward, nor was sending children away to
acquire skills; "upper class families of the time frequently sent adolescents to other families for
training." Id. at 894-96. "Adolescents" are a far cry from one year olds, however.
87. Id. at 894-96.
88. Quigley, supra note 67, at 93. See also Richard J. Ross, The Commoning of the Common
Law: The Renaissance Debate Over Printing English Law, 1520-1640, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 323, 390
(1998) (discussing "what has been called the 'crisis of order,' as population growth outstripped
economic opportunities, resulting in growing poverty, vagrancy, social polarization,
landlessness....").
89. Beier, supra note 74, at 4. See also Quigley, supra note 67, at 83-85, 87 (describing how
much of the population left the feudal manor in pursuit of better work); Areen, supra note 79, at 894-
95 (detailing how the "sturdy beggar began to fill the roads"); TenBroek, supra note 71, at 270-71
(describing the relationship between Poor Laws and the maintenance of the labor supply).
90. Areen, supra note 79, at 895. Children were again addressed in a 1576 act where the value
of providing work for children was specifically mentioned - "[t]o the intent youth may be
accustomed and brought up in labor and work" - but so was the public concern with the homeless
poor - "and then not like to grow to be idle rogues." Philip Harvey, Joblessness and the Law Before
the New Deal, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1, 16 (1999) (quoting An Act for the Setting of the
Poor on Work, and for the Avoiding of Idleness, 1575-1576, 18 Eliz., ch. 3, § 4 (Eng.) (spelling in
quotations was modified)).
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Poor Laws. It "fixed the character of poor relief for three centuries," 9'
and served as an archetype for early efforts in the American colonies,
and later, for legislative efforts in the states.92 The Poor Law Act of 1601
continued forced work for children, but also specifically linked forced
work and apprenticeships to children of those poor thought not "able to
keep and maintain their children."93 By 1601, then, the Poor Laws had
established a pattern that is discernible in today's dependency court. The
legislation empowered the state to deal with children whose parents were
unable to support them and part of that legislative model included taking
those children from the custody of their parents.94
While the obligation of the public to care for the poor became the
focus of the Poor Laws, protecting poor relief recipients, whether chil-
dren or not, from any associated stigma or trauma was not a special con-
cern.9 Generally the laws did not seek to stigmatize affirmatively those
individuals sanctioned as needing relief;96 there was simply little effort to
91. TenBroek, supra note 71, at 258.
92. Id. See also Quigley, supra note 67, at 127-28 (explaining how the English Poor Laws
represented the first attempt to remedy poverty through legislation).
93. An Act for the Relief of the Poor, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 2, § I (Eng.), reprinted in I1 The
Statutes at Large 702 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763). The statute also made financially able family
members of "every poor, old, blind, lame and impotent person, or other poor person not able to
work" financially responsible for each other, thus imposing a legal duty upon parents to support their
children, a duty not found in the common law. Id. at § 7 (included were fathers, grandfathers,
mothers, grandmothers and children), reprinted in H1 The Statutes at Large 703 (Owen Ruffhead, ed.,
1763). The responsibility laws applied only to the poor, and "the common law did not seek to
augment the poor law.... The courts continued to find that parents were under a natural duty and a
moral responsibility [to support their children] but not a legal obligation." TenBroek, supra note 7 1,
at 290. "If the son is left to starve, the exclusive remedy of the law is to apply to the parish poor law
authorities who will 'compel the father, if of ability, to pay for his son's support."' Id. at 291 n. 148
(quoting Shelton v. Springett, 138 Eng. Rep. 549, 550 (1851)). See also Quigley, supra note 67, at
127-28 (discussing how children of the poor could be taken from their families by operation of law).
94. TenBroek, supra note 71, at 286.
95. The concern was control and regulation by the state:
The Elizabethan poor law system proved ... a fertile source of special legal provisions
about the poor. These governed their subjection to public control, their condition of
idleness or labor, their freedom of choice of living arrangements, their right to travel and
settle where they pleased, their personal and civil rights. and their family relationships.
Regulation of those family relationships included the denial or subordination of parental
rights to custody, control, and determination of training or education .... The poor law
was thus not only a law about the poor but a law of the poor. It dealt with a condition, and
it governed a class ....
Id. (emphasis in original).
96. See generally Quigley, supra note 67, at 84, 87, 93, 102. By contrast, those designated as
not legitimate recipients, those seen as able-bodied persons refusing to work, were singled out for
punishment, and sometimes for the stigma of public punishment. The 1531 Act, for example,
provided that an unauthorized beggar who was a repeat offender would have "the upper part of the
gristle of his right ear cut off." An Act Concerning Punishment of Beggars and Vagabonds, 1531, 22
Hen. 8, ch. 12 (Eng.), reprinted in V Historical Documents 1485-1558 at 1027 (C.H. Williams, ed.,
1971).
Further, legitimate recipients were not always spared. The Poor Relief Act of 1662, An
Act for the Better Relief of the Poor of this Kingdom (The Act of Settlement), 14 Car. 2, ch. 12
(Eng.), reprinted in 1Ml The Statutes at Large 243 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763), for example, was
enacted primarily to respond to a concern that the rural poor were moving to cities and placing an
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eliminate social stigma associated with poor relief. Workhouses, for ex-
ample, establishments designed to thus reducing the cost of poor relief, 97
were designed to "make the receipt of aid so psychologically devastating
and so morally stigmatizing that only the truly needy would request
it....'98 While the implicit humiliation of the workhouse was theoretically
reserved for the able-bodied,9 their children were not exempt. A descrip-
tion of a 1795 workhouse: "The number of Paupers in the workhouse at
present... is 136 .... Of these 38 are under 10 years of age; 26 between
10 and 20 .... Their employments are various ... [and] children are
generally sent to the different manufactories ....
unfair burden on cities. Id. at § 1. See also Quigley, supra note 67, at 103-04 (describing how
London was being overrun by migratory rural settlers). As later amended, the Act required that poor
relief recipients, including children, wear a red or blue cloth "P" on their clothing:
And to the end that the money raised only for the relief of such as are well impotent as
poor, may not be misapplied and consumed by the idle, sturdy and disorderly beggars; be
it further enacted .. that every such person... [who] receive[s] relief [from] any parish.
• .and the wife and children of any such person cohabiting in the same house ... shall
upon the shoulder of the right sleeve of the upper-most garment of every such person, in
an open and visible manner, wear such badge or mark as is herein after mentioned and
expressed, that is to say, a large Roman P. together with the first letter of the name of the
parish or place whereof such poor person is an inhabitant, cut either in red or blue cloth,
as by the church wardens and overseers of the poor it shall be directed and appointed ....
An Act for Supplying Some Defects in the Laws for the Relief of the Poor of this Kingdom, 1697, 8
& 9 Will. 3, ch. 30 § 2 (Eng.), reprinted in III The Statutes at Large 681 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763).
See Quigley, supra note 67, at 106. The Act simply substituted stigma for judgment, and relied on
public branding as the mechanism for sorting out the truly needy from the merely idle.
97. Quigley, supra note 67, at 109. Workhouses were the most significant feature of the
modifications and reforms enacted in years after 1601 and were a primary component of the Poor
Relief Act. Id. at 109-113.
98. Id. at 110 (citing Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the
Unconscionabiliy Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom of Contract, 24 J.
LEGAL. STUD. 283, 310 (1995)).
99. Quigley, supra note 67, at 109.
100. See id. at 111 (quoting Rules of Kendal Workhouse, 1797, quoted in Sir Frederic Eden,
The State Of The Poor (1797) at 754-57, reprinted in 11 English Historical Documents (1783-1832)
at 446-48 (David C. Douglas, ed. 1959)). Workhouses went out of favor in the late 1700s, emerged
again in 1834, and retreated yet again. Quigley, supra note 67, at 112-13, 117, 124-25. See also Peter
M. Cicchino, The Problem Child: An Empirical Survey and Rhetorical Analysis of Child Poverty in
the United States, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 5, 76-77 (1996); George Fisher, The Birth of the Prison Retold,
104 YALE L.J. 1235, 1295-96 (1995).
The workhouse reflected English society's prevailing belief about the poor, and thus its
lack of concern about stigmatizing the poor. Being poor was usually a personal failing, not a result
of economic or societal factors. There was thus no need to protect those who deserved no protection.
The consideration for the design of poor relief was cost efficiency. Quigley, supra note 67, at 126-
27; TenBroek, supra note 71, at 286. Other motivations were sometimes present, however; for
example, the laws seemed to recognize "ethical concepts about the need for the individual to work,
and criminological concepts about the social results of idleness and vagrancy - but these forces were
only contributory .... The seminal source of the law of the poor .... was the need to curtail public
expenditures and to conserve public funds once the public undertook the burden [of support of the
poor]." Id. at 286-87.
The pain or stigma that accompanied relief ensured that assistance to the poor would only
be provided to those who had genuine need. Quigley lists as one of the "seven major principles one
can glean from the poor laws over these 500 years" that "assistance to the nonworking poor must not
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With the exception of providing poor relief to children in various
ways, the histories of the Poor Laws and any attendant institutions or
practices reflect little concern with protecting children. Relief was
grudgingly given, many apprenticeships and indentures were harsh, and
the stigma and trauma visited upon the recipients, including the children,
were largely irrelevant to the public paying for the support of the poor.
The Poor Laws may have established the legislative basis for modem
dependency court, but they did not establish a practice or custom, a his-
torical judgment, favoring confidentiality in dependency proceedings.
B. England's Parens Patriae in Chancery Court
While lacking support for confidentiality, the Poor Laws do provide
a good basis for arguing that the intervention in the parent-child relation-
ship in today's dependency court is a descendent of the English legisla-
tive branch.'"' The rationale for the court's authority to intervene, parens
patriae ("parent of the country"),' ° however, was borrowed from judicial
law developed in the English chancery courts.0 3 It makes sense that the
English chancery court felt obligated to justify its intervention. The Poor
Laws dealt with only the children of the poor; the chancery courts, how-
ever, dealt primarily with the children of the rich.'04 The English chan-
cery court appears to have been, like other English courts, an "open
court." However, the operation of the chancery court, along with its ju-
risdiction over matters involving children, does provide some support for
a historical judgment of confidential hearings for children.
The history of the Court of Chancery and parens patriae is difficult
to review briefly. Ample literature is available for more detail, but the
following summary will do for our purposes.)° The chancery court's
be generously given nor made too easy to accept," thus helping to ensure that "only those worthy of
help receive it." Quigley, supra note 67, at 126-27. Similarly, the removal of children from their
families and homes was not to safeguard children from the hands of neglectful or abusive parents; it
was to put the children to work, a "product of cost consciousness." Areen, supra note 79, at 896.
101. Rendleman, supra note 68, at 223.
102. DAVID MELLINKOFF, MELINKOFF'S DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL USAGE (West.
Pub. Co. 1992).
103. See generally Neil Howard Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of
"Parens Patriae," 22 S.C. L. REV. 147 (1970); Rendleman, supra note 68, at 210; TenBroek, supra
note 71, at 262.
104. Rendleman, supra note 68, at 210-11; Quigley, supra note 69, at 102-03.
105. For two excellent histories, see John Seymour, Parens Patriae and Wardship Powers:
Their Nature and Origins, 14 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994) and Cogan, supra note 103.
Cogan's self-appointed task was to show how the court's authority to take "special care" of infants
had evolved from extending care to infants "who were properly before [the court]" to when "the
court could properly bring infants before it to give them special care." Id. at 180. As Seymour warns,
however, it is important to exercise caution when drawing any conclusions from these or other
histories. "It is... impossible to be sure about the character of Chancery's jurisdiction at this time..
..'No inference can be drawn from the irregular proceedings of ancient times, when grievances of
every kind were pressed upon the Chancellor's attention."' Seymour, supra, at 166 (quoting
MACPHERSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO INFANTS 103 (1842)).
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origin is traced to matters that originally were brought before the King's
Council. These matters were often referred to the Chancellor, as a mem-
ber of the Council and the King's "chief secretary" and advisor.' °6 By the
close of the fifteenth century, this custom had evolved into a chancery
court.'0 7 The court's parens patriae authority seems to have developed
from its jurisdiction in wardship and guardianship issues,08 which origi-
nally concerned land and profits, and only incidentally, children. "Ward-
ship .... procedures... (and the role of the courts in administering these
procedures) were directed towards the administration of the property of
infant heirs. Wardship procedures were not designed with the purpose of
facilitating judicial intervention in the lives of vulnerable infants."', 9 By
the seventeenth century, however, so long as the ward-child was properly
before the court on an accounting or other similar matter," the reported
cases show the chancery court beginning to reflect a broader concern for
the child's care, for example, in matters related to custody."' By name,
however, parens patriae seems to have first appeared (as "Pater patriae")
in a chancery "infant case" in 1696. '12 Falkland v. Bertie"3 was a testa-
mentary trust case in which the court was asked to release an infant from
a condition precedent to a legacy, the condition precedent being a mar-
106. SIR GEOFFREY CROSS & G.D.G. HALL, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 98-101, 114-15 (4th
ed. 1964).
107. The Chancellor sat at the hearings and issued decrees in his name. Id. at 118.
108. Seymour, supra note 105, at 167.
109. Id. at 172. Wardships arose when a tenant of the land would die and leave an infant heir.
In wardships arising from military tenures (knight service), the lord who held the wardship,
including when the King was the direct holder, had the right to the profits of the lands until the child
came of age, along with other significant feudal benefits, including custody of the child and the right
to arrange the child's marriage. Id. at 162-163. See also Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the
Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L. J. 195, 196 n.12 (1978); Cogan, supra note 103, at 148-
49. These wardships, and thus their benefits and profits, could be purchased and were a source of
revenue for their holders, particularly the King who was "always lord and never tenant." Seymour,
supra note 105, at 164. See also Cogan, supra note 103, at 148. By contrast, there were also
wardships of land held in socage, not military tenure. In these cases, the wardship of the child went
to "the nearest relation to whom the land could not descend" and the holder of the wardship was
required to account to the child for any profits of the land. Seymour, supra note 105, at 163-665
nn.16 & 17. Because socage tenure required the holder to account to the ward-child for any profits of
the land, socage wardships suggested the fiduciary aspect inherent in a modem guardianship of a
child; it reflected an obligation of the guardian to the child. Id. at 162-65. Still, "[tihe orphaned
infant was treated as an adjunct to his lands," id. at 165 (quoting THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNE'rr, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 545 (5th ed., 1956)), and a guardianship at that time did
not resemble a modem day fiduciary relationship. Id, at 163.
110. Cogan, supra note 103, at 154-55.
111. E.g., Corsellis v. Corsellis, 23 Eng. Rep. 192, 194 (1678) (ordering that a guardian could
not have custody of "the Infant, but that he shall remain at Eaton till this Court give farther [sic]
Direction").
112. See Cogan, supra note 103, at 166. Cogan questions whether the phrase was in the case at
the outset, however. Id. at 167-68.
113. 23Eng. Rep. 814(Ch. 1696).
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riage."4 The court in Falkland recognized its parens patriae duty and
authority to take care of infants:
And as to the plea of infancy, it is true infants are always favoured. In
this court there were several things that belonged to the King as Pater
patriae, and fell under the care and direction of this court, as chari-
ties, infants, ideots, lunatics, etc., afterwards such of them as were of
profit and advantage to the King, were removed to the Court of
Wards by the statute; but upon the dissolution of that court came back
again to the Chancery, where the interests of infants are so far re-
garded and taken care of .... "'
The phrase appeared in a handful of chancery infant cases after
Falkland,"6 but the 1827 Wellesley v. The Duke of Beaufort' 7 infant case
is traditionally the case cited for the clear recognition that parens patriae
gave the chancery court broad power to make orders that would protect
the child, without first having the child before it on some property mat-
ter.''
8
The facts of Wellesley began when Mr. Wellesley had an extra-
marital affair; as a result, Mrs. Wellesley left with their children. Not
long afterwards, Mrs. Wellesley died. The children remained in the
physical custody of Mrs. Wellesley's sisters. Mr. Wellesley filed a ha-
beas corpus action to retrieve his children, and the sisters petitioned the
chancery court for relief."9 The chancery court's discussion of the basis
for its jurisdiction in the case, a private custody case, included a discus-
sion of parens patriae, 20 and the court concluded that it had jurisdiction
to protect the child:
The important consideration is, - is it necessary that the Court should
thus interpose? If this Court has not the power to interpose, what is
the provision of law that is made for the children? .... Wherever the
power of the law rests with respect to the protection of children, it is
clear that it ought to exist somewhere: if it be not in this Court, where
does it exist?'
2'
114. Falkland, 23 Eng. Rep. at 814.
115. Id.at818.
116. Two are traditionally discussed as bookends for the evolution of parens patriae in cases
involving children: Eyre v. The Countess of Shaftsbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722) and Wellesley
v. Duke of Beaufort, 38 Eng. Rep. 236 (Ch. 1827). Custer, supra note 109, at 204, 207. Parens
patriae's appearance in 1722 in Shaftsbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659, was not by the court, but was in the
reported argument of the Countess of Shaftsbury. See Sarah Abramowicz, English Child Custody
Law, 1660-1839: The Origins of Judicial Intervention in Paternal Custody, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1344, 1352 n.37 (1999).
117. 38 Eng. Rep. 236 (Ch. 1827).
118. See Cogan, supra note 103, at 180.
119. Wellesley, 38 Eng. Rep. at 236-38.
120. Id. at 243 ("[wlith respect to the doctrine that this authority belongs to the King as parens
patriae").
121. Id. at 244.
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Thus, by the time of Wellesley, the Poor Laws had established the
legislative basis for separating children from their parents when neces-
sary; Wellesley then provided the rationale for the judiciary to intervene
in the parent-child relationship. This legislation and this judicial rationale
would eventually combine to create America's juvenile court, where
confidential dependency proceedings would reside. But while the
groundwork for the proceedings existed, closed hearings for these types
of proceedings were not yet factors, or at least not yet newsworthy fac-
tors. Until this point, discussions concerning confidentiality in any of
these proceedings, especially as needed to serve the child's best interest,
are lacking in the reported cases and histories.
However, while histories of the English Court of Chancery, from
which parens patriae emerged, suggest that the court was, by all indica-
tions, open; Wellesley and a smattering of other authorities around the
same time indicate that there were some exceptions, sometimes in cases
involving children. In addition, even "open court," at least in chancery
court, did not necessarily provide public access in the way that open
court does today.
Wellesley is notable for its mention of a private hearing for "matters
of [its] kind,"' 23 and the case provides a brief discussion indicating some
matters in chancery court, and perhaps some matters involving children,
were heard in private. It also suggests some matters should be held in
private. What is not clear is whether the court's concern for privacy in
the immediate case was for the children, the adult parties, or the public:
I will give no opinion (because it does not become me to do so), as to
whether it were a discretion properly or improperly exercised, that
this matter was not heard in private. In most cases, certainly, it has
122. The absence of sources discussing private or confidential hearings indicates public access
was the norm for chancery court. In his book, W. J. Jones frequently refers to the Chancellor holding
hearings in "open" court. W.J. JONES, THE ELIZABETHAN COURT OF CHANCERY 54, 208, 253, 253
n. 1, 295 (1967). Other descriptions, by omitting any reference to closed hearings, imply the hearings
were open. E.g., EDWARD JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 165-169 (6th ed., Methuen &
Co., Ltd, London 1949). Other sources affirmatively suggest the court was open. E.g., Vernon
Valentine Palmer, "May God Protect Us from the Equity of Parlements ": Comparative Reflections
on English and French Equity Power, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1287, 1296-97 (1999) (comparing the French
and English Equity powers: "[Tihe [French] parlements [judicial tribunals] operated in total secrecy.
• . .In contrast, the English Chancellors operated an open court and pronounced reasons for their
decrees."). In addition, the reproduction of the illustration "The Lord Chancellor's Court at Lincoln's
Inn Hall," E.S. TURNER, MAY IT PLEASE YOUR LORDSHIP 193 (Michael Joseph Ltd. 1971), shows
an open court with spectators, and one author describes the King's Bench and the chancery court "at
the upper end of Westminster Hall" as "both remaining open to the hall, and a bar being erected to
keep off the multitude from pressing on the judges." JOHN G. HENDERSON, CHANCERY PRACTICE
143 (T.H. Flood & Co. 1904).
123. Wellesley, 38 Eng. Rep. at 243.
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been thought expedient that matters of this kind should be heard in
124private ....
Also notable is that in the same breath in which the court acknowl-
edged the possibility of a private hearing, thereby contributing to a his-
torical judgment favoring closed dependency hearings, it also contributed
to a discussion about the functional value of public court proceedings for
the important matter before it:
[B]ut if the parties choose to have matters of so much delicacy, but of
such mighty importance, discussed and argued in public, I know that
it is one of the best securities for the honest exercise of a judge's
duty, that he is to discharge that duty in public. That duty I will dis-
charge as well as I can - recollecting that what I am called upon to do
is a strong measure; that the interposition of this Court stands upon
principles, which it ought not to put into operation without keeping in
view all the feelings of a parent's heart, and all the principles of the
common law with respect to a parent's rights; and that, though the
Court has interposed in many instances of this sort, the application is
one of the most serious and important nature.' m
Wellesley is not the only evidence indicating that hearings involving
children around this time could be closed in chancery court. One infant
case decided six years prior to Wellesley, Lyons v. Blenkin,"6 also men-
tions a hearing held in chambers in another (unnamed) case. The court
states in a note to the opinion, "In a case which was heard in private be-
fore the Lord Chancellor in August 1821, his Lordship observed, that
where the infant was a ward of the Court there were many circumstances
to which he could give attention .... , 27 Lyons appears to have been held
in open court. Other infant cases, cited in the major articles discussing
the evolution of parens patriae in chancery court, also appear to have
been held in open court. However, none of the cases make any mention
of private or in-chambers hearings.'
28
In addition to cases sometimes mentioning private or closed hear-
ings for children, a later report by John David Chambers, from 1842
(fifteen years after Wellesley), states that, by that time at least, some suits
in chancery court involving infants were closed: "[P]etitions regarding
infants were heard before 'all proper parties,' but if a bill leads to a suit
'no person can so attend ... without special leave."" 129 Other commenta-
tors who have described the operations of Chancery court and infant par-
124. Id. at 242-43.
125. Id. at 243.
126. 37 Eng. Rep. 842 (Ch. 1821).
127. Lyons, 37 Eng. Rep. at 848 n.5.
128. See e.g., the cases cited in Cogan. supra note 103, at 180 (supporting the position that
none of these cases indicate they were heard in private).
129. See Sokol, supra note 28, at 909 n.209 (quoting JOHN DAVID CHAMBERS, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY OVER THE PERSONS AND
PROPERTY OF INFANTS 2 at 82 (London, Saunders & Benning 1842)).
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ens patriae cases (mostly from earlier years), however, have not men-
tioned that infant cases were subject to any special rules concerning be-
ing held in private.
30
Another factor to consider, when reviewing the history of hearings
involving children in chancery, is that chancery hearings were not con-
ducted like modern day trials. As a result, there was at least a coinciden-
tal lack of openness. Generally, witness testimony was taken with written
interrogatories administered by court-appointed examiners; these proofs,
and others, were placed before the court, and the court, after hearing the
arguments of the lawyers, would issue its decree. 3' Viva voce, or oral
examinations of witnesses in open court, appear to have been limited.
32
In addition, because of the great number of cases, a matter set for hearing
would frequently be referred to an administrative "Master," 33 who would
"draw up a report on which the Lord Chancellor would base his deci-
sion.' 3" And, when detailed inquiries were needed before a court could
130. Id. at 909 n.210 (stating that S. ATKINSON, PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 15-19
(London, S. Sweet et al. eds., 1842) and CHARLES BARTON, AN HISTORICAL TREATISE OF A SUIT IN
EQUITY (Dublin, Byrne ed., 1796), never mentioned this). See also JONES, supra note 122; CROSS &
HALL, supra note 106.
131. CROSS & HALL, supra note 106, at 148-49. A typical description of witness testimony is
as follows:
[A] number of questions in writing were framed by the party calling the witnesses, and
these questions... were put to the witness by an examiner appointed by the court. The
answers, given on oath, were recorded and copies could be taken by the other side....
When the depositions . . .had all been taken the case was set down for hearing and
eventually would come on in court. The allegations of each side would be explained to
the Chancellor (who had copies of the affidavits before him) and counsel would address
him on the points of law involved. It was then for the Chancellor to make up his mind on
all the issues of law and fact involved in the case and to pronounce a decree ....
Id. While the witness testimony was "published" (made available to the parties after the examiners
deposed the witnesses), the parties had separate examinations and did not have access to copies of
the other party's examinations until publication. This ensured that the "adversant party's 'cross-
examination' could not be inspired by any knowledge of the witness's evidence in chief." JONES,
supra note 122, at 238-39.
132. JONES, supra note 122, at 252-54.
133. CROSS & HALL, supra note 106, at 153,
134. JONES, supra note 122, at 253. A part of this process might include the advantage of some
oral examination of witnesses; the disadvantage is that this was done not in open court, but in
chambers: "In the privacy of his chambers, a Master ... could get to grips with a witness, or for that
matter with one of the parties, and fight it out with the aid of flexible cross-examination." Id. at 254.
In addition, while "It]he Lord Chancellor might order viva voce examination at a hearing ... [t]his
was a rare procedure in open court ..... Id. at 253. One author also reports a method used for a time
by which witnesses were examined ad informandum conscientiam iudicis, id. at 250, "intended for
the sight of the judge alone." Id. at 499. Examinations ad informandum conscientiam iudicis were
meant for circumstances when embarrassing information might be revealed by the interrogatories put
to the witness. This evidence, "regarded as unfit for general publication, and thus reserved for the
eye of the bench, was often concerned with the interests, activities, or investments of the Crown." Id.
at 250-51. Such examinations were also frequently used even when there was not potential for
embarrassment, but simply to obtain more information when the ordinary interrogatories failed to
cover matters relevant and important to the suit. Id. at 252. Examinations ad informandum
conscientiam iudicis were no longer used by the latter half of the seventeenth century, however. Id.
at 252 n.3.
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rule, such as when the question was whether a trustee had discharged the
necessary duties,' "the Chancellor, who was far too busy a person for
such details, would refer the matter to a Master for investigation in the
presence of the parties and for a report on which the Chancellor could
subsequently found his decree."'
' 36
It seems likely that, given the chancery court's procedures and
practices, some of its proceedings were not routinely subject to public
access. With the court's awakening concern for protecting children and
its willingness to act as parens patriae, it is also likely that some of those
proceedings involved children. Histories of the court, however, do not
suggest any substantial portion of the court's "courtroom proceedings"
involving children were purposefully and routinely conducted in a court-
room closed to the public until Chambers' report in 1842. Nor do the
earlier histories suggest the public was frequently barred from hearings
involving children in order to "protect" the children. Finally, even when
some hearings were being closed, the court's comment in Wellesley also
indicates the chancery court was aware of the value of open court, in-
cluding in cases involving the welfare of children.
37
C. America's Poor Laws and Parens Patriae
The Poor Laws and parens patriae both found their way to America.
Colonial America first relied on forced apprenticeships and institutional
"houses" to deal with the children of the poor 38 and, when the original
thirteen states enacted legislation, England's Poor Laws were quite evi-
dent. 39 At least eleven of the thirteen states provided that poor or unruly
135. CROSS & HALL, supra note 106, at 122.
136. Id. at 123. In addition, many matters were not dealt with in hearings before the Chancellor,
but referred to administrative personnel for action or resolution in chambers. W.J. Jones' thorough
description of the Elizabethan Court of Chancery (1558-1603) also shows that court personnel did
much of the work of the Chancery court. JONES, supra note 122, at 6, 52, 208, 287. How "open"
these investigations and other inquiries were is not clear. Descriptions or references to the Chancery
court suggest much work was done in chambers, CROSS & HALL, supra note 106, at 271; JONES,
supra note 122, at 6, 52, 208, 287, and also done with very little oversight by the court. "[T]he
detailed, and often very important, administrative business which was transacted in chambers was
left entirely to the Masters and clerks of the court." CROSS & HALL, supra note 106, at 271.
From time to time a Chancellor would issue a set of "general orders" prescribing (among
other matters) the method of procedure to be followed in the prosecution of accounts and
enquiries [sic] before the Masters, but in the nature of the case he was not able to exercise
much control in the matter, and the masters were in fact given practically a free hand ....
Id. at 155.
137. The Wellesley court did not take it upon itself to close the proceedings, apparently
believing it could do so only upon request of one of the parties. Wellesley v. The Duke of Beaufort,
38 Eng. Rep. 236, 243 (Ch. 1827) ("but if the parties choose to have matters ...discussed and
argued in public").
138. William P. Quigley, Work or Starve: Regulation of the Poor in Colonial America, 31
U.S.F. L. REV. 35,48 (1996).
139. See William P. Quigley, Reluctant Charity: Poor Laws in the Original Thirteen States, 31
U. RICH. L. REV. 111, 115 (1997).
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children could be "bound out" or apprenticed for work.'40 Children were
institutionalized in almshouses and poorhouses, along with workhouses,
houses of correction, and houses of employment.' 4' Thus, children of the
poor continued to be separated from their parents and were subjected to
forced labor under harsh conditions, just as they were under the English
Poor Laws.42 While this separation was "independent ... of any Latin
rubric,"'143 the Latin rubric would eventually join up with the Poor Laws,
although not until 1839.'" There are hints that in the interim, some con-
cern existed for "protecting" children from stigma in related welfare ar-
eas.' 4 An 1804 Washington, D.C., act making public schooling available
to poor children, for example, provided that the names of the children
who could not pay for their education should be withheld from public
reports.'4 Similar statutes in Delaware 47 and Pennsylvania, 48 however,
had no such provisions, and like in England, most legislation was fo-
cused on caring for the poor at the least cost to the public.
49
In 1839, the rationale for court intervention to protect children and
the legislative provisions for separating children from their parents fi-
nally joined." Ex parte Crouse,' a Pennsylvania case, is credited with
first using parens patriae to justify a state committing a child to an in-
stitution over the objection of the parent.'52 The court committed the "in-
corrigible" girl, Mary Ann Crouse, to a house of refuge without a jury
trial after her mother complained that the child was beyond her control.'53
Her father brought a habeas corpus action arguing that the authorizing
legislation was unconstitutional.'" The court upheld the statute and the
commitment, reasoning:
The House of Refuge is not a prison, but a school .... The object of
the charity is reformation, by training its inmates to industry; by im-
buing their minds with principles of morality and religion; by fur-
nishing them with means to earn a living; and, above all, by separat-
ing them from the corrupting influence of improper associates. To
140. Id. at 119-40, and 153.
141. Id. at 156.
142. Id.
143. Rendleman, supra note 68, at 212.
144. Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839).
145. See generally CHILDREN AND YouTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, vol. I:
1600-1865 (Robert H. Bremner ed. 1970).
146. Id. at 252.
147. Id. at 253.
148. Id. at 251.
149. See Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect, Part I: Historical Overview, Legal
Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REv. 293, 301 (1972).
150. Ex Parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839).
151. Crouse, 4 Whart. at 11.
152. Rendleman, supra note 68, at 212.
153. Crouse, 4 Whart. at 11.
154. Id.
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this end may not the natural parents, when unequal to the task of edu-
cation, or unworthy of it, be superseded by the parens patriae, or
common guardian of the community? It is to be remembered that the
public has a paramount interest in the virtue and knowledge of its
members, and that of strict right, the business of education belongs to
it. That parents are ordinarily intrusted with it is because it can sel-
dom be put into better hands; but where they are incompetent or cor-
rupt, what is there to prevent the public from withdrawing their fac-
ulties, held, as they obviously are, at its sufferance?'55
What indeed? Under a theory of child protection, Ex parte Crouse
upheld a state's authority to separate a child from its parents, or in the
words of one author, to "sever ... poor parents from their children."'
56
Most courts followed suit, upholding the reach of the Poor Laws into the
lives of poor families and, later, upholding the reach of the juvenile
court."'
D. America's Child Savers in the 1800s
At the beginning of the 1800s in America, just as in England, poor
children and poor children neglected by their parents were taken from
their parents and apprenticed or placed in almshouses or similar facili-
ties, many of which also housed "adult outcasts - paupers and insane and
mentally retarded persons."'5 s Except for that intervention into the lives
of the poor, however, public intervention into the family life to protect
children was rare. 5 9 Parental child abuse was frequently overlooked be-
cause the right of parents to discipline their children usually legitimated
all but the most egregious cases of abuse.' 60 Children accused and con-
victed of crimes were not subjects of protection for the state; they were
tried and punished much like adults were, often sharing space in the
same correctional institutions.' 6' Reformers sought to change this, how-
ever, and their nineteenth century reform agenda pushed for a more pro-
tective attitude concerning the country's children and culminated into the
country's first juvenile court. Not until the advent of the juvenile court,
however, would closed hearings and confidential proceedings be a cog-
nizant aspect of the protective agenda.
155. Id.
156. Rendleman, supra note 68, at 212.
157. See, e.g., Marlow v. Commonwealth, 133 S.W. 1137 (Ky. 1911); Commonwealth v.
Fisher, 62 A. 198 (Pa. 1905).
158. Thomas, supra note 149, at 301-03. See also, Rendelman, supra note 68, at 205-12
(reasoning that statutes designed to protect children makes the state the legitimate guardian of the
child).
159. Thomas, supra note 149 at 301.
160. Id. at 300-06.
161. Paul R. Rudof, Throwing out the Baby with the Bathwater: Utah's Serious Youth Offender
Statute, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 443, 444 (1998); Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L.
REV. 104, 106 (1909).
2001]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Although social reform efforts at the start of the century were broad-
based, they particularly targeted children. "Child savers," as they came to
be called, sought to address issues associated with poor children, includ-
ing education, nutrition, and neglect and abuse.' 62 Also, they were con-
cerned with child crime. 63 Central to the child-savers' philosophy was
that children were products of their environments. Any criminal behavior
by a child was, thus, "learned" behavior.' 64 To reform a child who had
committed a crime, and to prevent the predelinquent child from adopting
a life of crime, it was necessary to address the child's environment.'65
This meant public intervention into the child's family life.'66
Because of the large number of immigrants entering the country and
especially the cities in the 1800s, public intervention was a remedy that
particularly invited abuse. The new city dwellers were poor and "differ-
ent":
Immigrants from southern and eastern Europe and from rural Amer-
ica flooded into the burgeoning cities to take advantage of new eco-
nomic opportunities and crowded into ethnic enclaves and urban
ghettoes. The "new" immigrants' sheer numbers and their cultural,
religious, and linguistic differences hindered their assimilation and
acculturation, and posed a significant nation-building challenge for
the dominant Anglo-Protestant Western Europeans who had arrived a
few generations earlier .... Progressives attempted to "Americanize"
the immigrants and poor through a variety of agencies of assimilation
and acculturation to become sober, virtuous, middle-class Americans
like themselves. 167
Reformers targeted the children of these new urban dwellers not
only to keep them from crime, but also because they were a threat to the
social order middle-class child-savers were accustomed to and favored.
Just as England enacted its Poor Laws to protect society from the "wan-
162. Rudof, supra note 161 at 444.
163. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation Of The Juvenile Court--Part I: Race And The "Crack
Down" On Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 395 n.16 (1999); Rudof, supra note 161, at 444-45.
164. ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIENCE 36
(Hill & Wang 1978).
165. Id.
166. Larry J. Siegel & Joseph J. Senna, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 363 (West 1988).
167. Feld, supra note 163, at 332-34. While concern for the children was perhaps the primary
motivation for efforts by the end of the century, xenophobia and fear of crime were still present. The
creation of the juvenile court system and its antecedents was, according to M.A. Bortner, "a thinly
disguised system of oppression, dedicated to controlling the indigent and powerless." M.A.
BORTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE COURT: THE TARNISHED IDEAL OF INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE 2 (New
York University Press 1982) (citing ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF
DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977) and THE CHILDREN ISHMAEL: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUVENILE
JUSTICE (Barry Krisberg & James Austin eds., Mayfield 1978)); Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice
Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV., 1187, 1187-95 (1970). These concerns still
echo in the literature today. E.g., Feld, supra note 163, at 330.
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dering" poor "terroriz[ing] town and country," '6' the child-savers sought
to use similar legislative remedies to save not only children, but also
America's middle-class culture.' 69
Consequently, the child-savers' early legislative efforts, directed at
preventing children from lives of crime, went beyond delinquent and
predelinquent children and focused on a broad range of indicators re-
formers considered to be troubling.' 70 This meant dependent and ne-
glected children were included in the reformers' child-protective efforts,
but' lines were blurred. Poor children became dependent or neglected
children; dependent and neglected children became delinquent children.
An 1875 Wisconsin statute defining children who could be committed to
industrial schools, for example, included children who had been aban-
doned "in any way" by their parents; children "without means of subsis-
tence or support"; children "begging or receiving alms"; children "being
in any public street or place for the purpose of begging or receiving
alms"; children "found wandering and not having any home or settled
place of abode"; and children "found wandering in streets, alleys or pub-
lic places, and belonging to that class of children called 'ragpickers.""0 7'
Some states defined "wayward behavior" as criminal conduct; others
"broaden[ed] the committal grounds for noncriminal conduct.' ' 2 Chil-
dren subject to institutional commitment during this period were
"broadly worded under the aegis" of social reform,' 73 and these broad
definitions would be used in the twentieth century juvenile court legisla-
tion.
The salvation of these children and, thus, of society, required re-
moving them from the corrupting influences of their home environments
and acculturating them anew.' 74 Many were sent to institutions, and espe-
cially to "Houses of Refuge."' 715 Beginning with New York in 1825 and,
over the next twenty-five years, continuing in Philadelphia, Boston, New
Orleans and other cities, "laws authorized the courts to commit ne-
glected, destitute, abandoned, and vagrant children to the houses of ref-
168. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
169. Fox, supra note 167, at 1192.
170. Thomas, supra note 149, at 306, 323-25; Corinne Schiff, Child Custody And The Ideal Of
Motherhood In Late Nineteenth Century New York, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 403, 413
(1997).
171. Thomas, supra note 149, at 314 (quoting 1875 Wis. Laws 633, ch. 325, § 5).
172. Robert W. Sweet, Jr., Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders: In Perspective, 18 PEPP.
L. REV. 389, 392 (1991).
173. Thomas, supra note 149, at 314.
174. Fox, supra note 167, at 1189. These actions were done with little regard for the rights of
the parents or the children. "The child-savers expounded the Protestant work ethic, were primarily
philanthropic, and supported the rehabilitation model. They had little real interest in the law or legal
issues. Any overreach of the legal rights of the children was excused under the concept of parens
patriae." CLIFFORD E. SIMONSEN, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA 18 (3d ed. 1991). See also
Thomas, supra note 149, at 315 (also reporting that parens patriae served as the catch-all
justification for removing children from their homes).
175. Thomas, supra note 149, at 306; RYERSON, supra note 164, at 18-19.
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uge along with child offenders."'76 Unfortunately, refuge houses and their
successors were not always the protective facilities envisioned by their
backers. The New York house, for example, "evolved into a prison-like
structure without facilities for rehabilitation.' 77 Other institutional facili-
ties that continued from earlier years, or developed after refuge houses,
were subject to similar criticism.' The Reverend Charles Loring Brace's
"program of 'moral disinfection,"' according to one cynic, 79 which took
children from their homes and their urban environments to live in foster
homes with Western farmers"' ° or, in Brace's words, "good families in
the country,"' 8 was a noteworthy alternative placement.
Until the latter part of the 1800s then, dependent and neglected chil-
dren were included within the child-savers' efforts, but primarily under
the rubric of delinquent or predelinquent children. In 1874, however, the
New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NYSPCC)
was established. The NYSPCC emphasized removing children from their
homes and placing them in institutions. 82 Their efforts, however, seem-
ingly were directed more towards protecting children from abuse and
neglect per se, than preventing delinquency." The NYSPCC was not
only instrumental in seeking out neglected and abused children, but also
was dedicated to punishing adult offenders by encouraging criminal
prosecution of abusive or otherwise harmful parents1H Their focus was,
therefore, distinguishable from that of the English Poor Laws and the
earlier child-saving efforts.
Similar anti-cruelty groups were established in other localities over
the next twenty-five years. Massachusetts and Philadelphia, for example,
moved further and adopted a less punitive and more remedial approach
to the problem, aimed at helping families and keeping children in the
176. Thomas, supra note 149, at 306.
177. Carla J. Stovall, Justice and Juveniles in Kansas: Where We Have Been and Where We
Are Headed, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 1021, 1022 (1999).
178. Fox, supra note 167, at 1223; John N. Kane, Jr., Dispositional Authority and Decision
Making in New York's Juvenile Justice System: Discretion at Risk, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 925, 931
(1994); Brent Pattison, Minority Youth in Juvenile Correctional Facilities: Cultural Differences and
the Right to Treatment, 16 LAW & LNEQ. 573, 590 (1998); Mary E. Spring, Extended Jurisdiction
Juvenile Prosecution: A New Approach to the Problem of Juvenile Delinquency in Illinois, 31 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1351, 1356-57 (1998).
179. Thomas, supra note 149, at 307.
180. Id.
181. Charles L. Brace, The Best Method of Disposing of Pauper and Vagrant Children 12
(1859), as quoted in Lucy S. McGough and Annette Peltier-Falahahwazi, Secrets and Lies: A Model
Statute for Cooperative Adoption, 60 LA. L. REV. 13, 90 n.67 (1999).
182. Thomas, supra note 149, at 310-12.
183. ELIZABETH HAFKIN PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 79-86 (1987).
184. Wright S. Walling & Gary A. Debele, Private Chips Petitions in Minnesota: The
Historical and Contemporary Treatment of Children in Need of Protection or Services, 20 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 781, 794-96 (1994); Thomas, supra note 149, at 310-11.
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home." 5 This social work approach found some favor in the early 1900s
with professionals in the field who were supportive of family preserva-
tion, especially when poverty was the only issue. 8 6 While concern for
children was perhaps a greater motivation for the anti-cruelty groups'
efforts than others, however, "these reformers [also] were responding to
the new urban poverty and immigration" and the resulting fear:
The "large influx of foreigners who are not familiar with our laws,"
explained Elbridge Gerry, the president of the NYSPCC, in 1895,
"necessarily leads to the continual ill-treatment of children, under the
pernicious idea that liberty means license and that children are born
slaves of their parents." Without the work of the NYSPCC, Gerry
maintained, nothing would be done to protect the children of the
"poor and unfortunate," and most of these "little outcasts" would be-
come "mature criminals."' 87
In addition to implementing efforts to rescue children from lives of
crime, reformers also had some success in changing the judicial proce-
dures that removed children from their homes and committed them to
institutions or foster homes. Some legislation specifically provided for
children's hearings to be separate from adult court. An 1870 Massachu-
setts statute, for example, provided that children in Suffolk under the age
of sixteen should have "complaints against them heard and determined,
by themselves, separate from the general and ordinary criminal business
of said courts."' 8  New York provided, by 1892, that "[a]ll cases involv-
ing the commitment or trial of children for any violation of the Penal
Code... may be heard and determined by such court, at suitable times to
be designated therefore by it, separate and apart from the trial of other
criminal cases . ,,89 Rhode Island too provided for children's hearings
to be separate from the rest of the court business.' 9° Closed hearings were
not statutorily mandated, but the separateness of the hearings presumably
accommodated or encouraged private hearings. Further, juvenile com-
mitment hearings also were likely to be informal, summary, and with
little due process,' 9' making it probable that some were held away from
public view. Closed and confidential hearings per se, however, seem not
to have been a concern.
Thus, at the close of the nineteenth century, the institutions, legisla-
tion, and procedures designed to deal with abused and neglected children
had their problems: the motivation for removing children from their
homes was often suspect, the due process accorded the families was of-
185. Walling & Debele, supra note 184, at 794-96; Thomas, supra note 149, at 312.
186. Thomas, supra note 149, at 312; PLECK, supra note 183, at 129.
187. Schiff, supra note 170, at 413.
188. Bremner, supra note 145, at Vol. , 494-95.
189. Id. at Vol. H, 495.
190. Id. at Vol. 11, 495-96.
191. Fox, supra note 167, at 1212-15, 1229; see also Thomas, supra note 149, at 315. But see
People ex rel. O'Connell v. Tumer, 55 Ill. 280, 285-87 (1870).
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ten absent, a family's poverty was frequently the basis for a child's re-
moval, and the institutions or homes to which some of the children were
sent were far from nurturing and humane places. Indeed, these same
problems were present during the enactment and implementation of the
Poor Laws in England. As for confidential hearings, some delinquency or
dependency-type proceedings may have been heard separately from the
other court business. Also, there may have been, as there was in Eng-
land's chancery court, specific cases heard in chambers, either upon re-
quest of the parties or perhaps even at the initiative of the judge. It does
not appear, however, that these type hearings were traditionally closed to
the public. 92
There was, however, at least in the rhetoric of the late nineteenth
century, an intent by society to protect children - to reform, rehabilitate,
and treat - instead of merely punishing them for their wrongful acts or
removing them from their homes and forcing them to work. Eventually,
the modem dependency proceeding emerged from this philosophy and
justified the confidentiality provision of modem proceedings. In the ju-
venile court born in 1900, however, protecting dependent and abused
children remained a handmaiden to protecting society from delinquent
children.
E. America's Juvenile Court and its Confidentiality Provision
In 1899, Illinois passed legislation, which created the country's first
juvenile court. 19 3 By 1904, other states embraced the concept and eleven
states had juvenile court legislation; by 1912, twenty-two states; and by
1925, forty-six of the country's forty-eight states had juvenile court leg-
islation. 94 When Illinois founded its court in 1900, however, the goal was
to deal with children committing crimes and, in society's view, children
destined to commit crimes. Earlier legislation grouped delinquent, ne-
glected, abused, abandoned, and poor children together and Illinois con-
tinued that grouping.9 5 Central to the treatment of these delinquent and
192. See Brelsford & Myers, supra note 3, at 17.
193. Act of April 21, 1899, 1899 Ill. Laws § 3, 130, 132.
[T]here has been some mild controversy about the exact place of origin of the first
juvenile court. Various earlier pieces of special legislation bore resemblance to the latter-
day juvenile court. It seems clear, however, that the first real juvenile court, as we
understand the institution today [1958], was organized in the United States during 1899.
Most authorities agree that Illinois deserves credit for fathering the juvenile court
movement, though Colorado's ebullient Judge Lindsey claimed this honor on the basis of
his use of the state's 'school law' for the handling of juvenile offenders some months
before the Illinois law was enacted .... [But] Colorado's legislature did not specifically
organize the state's juvenile court until 1903.
Gilbert Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 101, 103-04 (1958)
(footnotes omitted) (citing 1903 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 85).
194. Geis, supra note 193, at 105.
195. "Delinquent" children were defined as "any child under the age of 16 years who violates
any law of this State or any city or village ordinance." 1899 Ill. Laws § 1. The statutory definition of
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pre-delinquent children, however, was not punishment, but remedial ac-
culturation."' The goal of the juvenile court was to identify and remedy
factors in the child's life that had led, or might lead, the child astray.'97
While the protective aspects of a confidential modem dependency pro-
ceeding were not the focus of the court, the genesis of the proceeding
was there; so was the genesis of legislated confidentiality.
The Illinois legislation did not mandate confidentiality.'98 The stat-
ute did require, however, "[a] special court room, to be designated as the
juvenile court room... .- '99 Still, this provision has long been recognized
as a "confidentiality" provision and it seems apparent that it soon was
treated as such. In addition, it also seems likely that many juvenile court
hearings initially were confidential by practice and, later, by legislative
the "dependent child and neglected child" mixed what would today be classified as status offenses,
dependency, abuse and simple poverty:
[Any child [under age 161 who for any reason is destitute or homeless or abandoned; or
dependent upon the public for support; or has not proper parental care or guardianship; or
who habitually begs or receives alms; or who is found living in any house of ill fame or
with any vicious or disreputable person; or whose home, by reason of neglect, cruelty or
depravity on the part of its parents, guardian or other person in whose care it may be, is
an unfit place for such a child; and any child under the age of 8 years who is found
peddling or selling any article or singing or playing any musical instrument upon the
streets or giving any public entertainment.
1899 11. Laws §1. The effect of the Illinois statute was no discernable category for children who
needed to be protected from abuse or neglect, but instead a catch-all grouping of poor children, pre-
delinquent children, and delinquent children, who were to be "treated in substantially the same
manner." Charles E. Springer, Vice-Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Nevada, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Justice for Juveniles at 21 (1986). The
definition of delinquent was expanded substantially in a 1905 amendment, Act of May 13, 1905,
1905 Ill. Laws § I, and all sorts of acts or conditions qualified a child as "delinquent," including
children who were "incorrigible," children who ran away from home, children visiting pool rooms,
and children who "habitually used vile, obscene, vulgar, profane or indecent language." Id.,
196. RYERSON, supra note 164, at 35-37.
197. See id.
198. See Samuel J. Barrows, CHILDREN'S COURT IN THE UNITED STATES: THEIR ORIGIN,
DEVELOPMENT, AND RESULTS, H.R. Doc. No.701 (58  Sess. 1904).
199. "A special court room, to be designated as the juvenile court room shall be provided for
the hearing of [cases under this act], and the findings of the court shall be entered in a book or books
to be kept for that purpose and known as the 'Juvenile Record'...." 1899 111. Laws § 3.
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200provisions. Judge Thomas Murphey, a Police Justice in Buffalo, N.Y.,described in 1904 how he ran his court:20'
At the first session over the court at which I presided I announced that
thereafter children would be tried separately and apart from adults,..
. and I insisted that at the trial of the children the court room be
cleared of all spectators. No one was allowed to be present at the tri-
als but the defendants, the complainants, and the court officers and
witnesses. 2
A 1958 article discussing confidentiality of juvenile court proceed-
ings also reports that the practice of excluding the public seems to have
occurred early on. "By 1901, judges were reported to be employing-their
own authority to hold the hearings of juveniles in private,"2 3 relying on
their contempt power to do so. '2 4 And "a hit or miss survey" done in
1910 showed that "a few states" excluded the public from juvenile court
trials.205 By 1939, a substantial number of states had some confidentiality
provisions concerning their juvenile courts.206 "IT]he public was excluded
from juvenile courts by law in seven jurisdictions, and could be excluded
in twenty-four additional jurisdictions. Eight states specifically prohib-
ited the publication of the names of juveniles without the court's con-
sent." 207
200. Determining precisely how and where the confidentiality aspect of juvenile court
originated is difficult. From early on, affirmative mentions of confidentiality were not explicitly
associated with the stigma, shame and embarrassment concerns for the juvenile delinquent. It may be
that the need for closed hearings was so apparent, and so much a part of the prevailing philosophy,
that there was no need to discuss it. "Removing these cases from the criminal courts" may have also
meant keeping them from the public eye, without explicit mention of that need. The custom of the
predecessor proceedings also probably played a part. These proceedings were sometimes
confidential; it seems, not so much from an affirmative legislative decision, but from a practice of
informal, "summary," and chambers-like proceedings that did little to suggest there should be a
public involvement. Thus, it is likely that hearings concerning delinquent, abused or neglected
children, were occasionally closed in the later 1800s, that closed hearings simply continued at the
beginnings of juvenile court, and that they quickly became legislatively or rule mandated.
201. The applicable statute provided that the proceedings for commitment or trial of any
children charged with violating the Penal Code "may be heard ... separate and apart from the trial of
any other criminal cases, of which session a separate docket shall be kept." See Barrows, supra note
198, at 10.
202. See id.
203. Geis, supra note 193, at 116.
204. See id.
205. Id. (citing Abbott, A Topical Abstract of Juvenile Court Laws Governing the Trial and
Disposition of Juvenile Offenders, in JUVENILE COURT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 132 (Hart. ed.
1910)).
206. Seeid. atll6-17.
207. Id. at 117. Geis says there were only "insignificant roadblocks" as the juvenile court made
its way through some constitutional challenges, and in "none of the early cases did the question of
the publication of juveniles' names by newspapers, the coverage of juvenile court hearings by the
press, or the privacy of the hearings come into controversy." Id. at 110, 110 n.37.
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One of the factors that probably contributed to the quick evolution
of confidential hearings was the informality thought critical to delin-
quency hearings. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge of the Circuit Court of Illi-
nois, described the Illinois statute in a Congressional Report in 1904,
writing that the "[t]he hearing of the case is in the open court,""2 ' but
adding that it was done:
with little of the formality usually observed in court proceedings. I
have always felt and endeavored to act in each case as I would were it
my own son that was before me in my library at home charged with
some misconduct .... I first speak to him in a kindly and considerate
way, endeavoring to make him feel that there is no purpose on the
part of anyone about him to punish, but rather to benefit and help...
209
The lack of formality was consistent with the reformers' reform philoso-
phy and set the tone for concern and help, as opposed to judgment and
punishment.210 Closed hearings were conducive to this desired informal-
ity.
Closed or confidential hearings also were consistent with another
concern the reformers had - protecting the delinquent child from the
stigma of being branded a criminal. Keeping delinquency proceedings
confidential would bury the errors of the child's youthful mistakes from
others and further protect the child from the stigma and trauma of pub-
licity generally. 21' "[T]he duty of the state ... [is] not to degrade but to
uplift, not to crush but to develop, not to make [the child] a criminal but
a worthy citizen."22
208. See Barrows, supra note 198, at 3.
209. See id. Judge Julian Mack, one of Chicago's juvenile court's first judges, described the
scene juvenile court proponents envisioned:
The problem for determination by the judge is not, Has this boy or girl committed a
specific wrong, but What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done
in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career.... The
child who must be brought into court... [must] be made to feel that he is the object of its
care and solicitude. The ordinary trappings of the court-room are out of place in such
hearings. The judge on a bench, looking down upon the boy standing at the bar, can never
evoke a proper sympathetic spirit. Seated at a desk, with the child at his side, where he
can on occasion put his arm around his shoulder and draw the lad to him, the judge ...
will gain immensely in the effectiveness of his work.
Mack, supra note 161, at 119-20.
210. "The elimination of procedural formality in the courtroom presumably freed the judge to
employ all available resources in gaining the child's confidence . . . thereby beginning the
resocialization process." RYERSON, supra note 164, at 39. See also Mack, supra note 161, at 107,
120.
211. See Susan S. Greenebaum, Conditional Access to Juvenile Court Proceedings: A Prior
Restraint of a Viable Solution?, 44 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 135, 142-43 (1993); Oddo,
supra note 7, at I 1; Zierdt, supra note 36, at 420.
212. Mack, supra note 161, at 107.
Although not a criminal conviction, a delinquency adjudication has the same stigmatizing
effect in practice. The stigma can have serious, adverse consequences for a juvenile
offender and his chances for rehabilitation.... Society perceives delinquency as deviant
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Both of these concerns however - informal hearings and eliminating
stigma - along with closed hearings, were associated with delinquency
proceedings. Abuse and neglect matters remained secondary to delin-
quency concerns and the literature discussing juvenile court during the
first half of the century reflected that. A 1909 Harvard Law Review arti-
cle by Judge Julian Mack, for example, talked about "the juvenile court"
in connection with "the delinquent child."23
A 1943 article in the Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly ob-
served that "[i]t is the aim of our laws to protect society and its members.
It is the aim of our juvenile laws to save an erring and ofttimes head-
strong boy from continuing a life of crime.",214 A children's court judge in
White Plains, New York wrote in 1949 that the purpose of the juvenile
court,
in working with children is to endeavor to understand the problems
which have caused them to become in need of the care and protection
of the State, to alleviate adverse conditions as far as possible, and to
bring understanding and guidance to the children who have become
delinquent, as well as to those verging on delinquency because of ne-
glect."'
A 1957 article on confidentiality in juvenile court began by noting that
"U]uvenile court proceedings are often regarded as the most progressive
and promising avenue for the handling of youthful offenders. 21 6
Eventually, however, governmental involvement in children's issues
would elevate abuse and neglect concerns. In 1909 the White House held
its first Conference on Children217 and three years later, Congress created
behavior; therefore, society responds negatively to juveniles who have been labeled
delinquent. Specifically, once aware of the juvenile's label, as well as his deviant acts,
society responds differently to the juvenile, attempting to ostracize him from the
community. At this point, the juvenile becomes aware of his delinquency label and his
self-image is adversely affected. The juvenile begins to believe that "he is no good or that
he can't make it on the outside." Eventually, the juvenile "becomes committed to deviant
activities and peers" and views himself as a deviant. Unable to escape society's label, the
juvenile engages in more delinquent behavior. Consequently, the label's stigma creates a
self-fulfilling prophecy that tends to incite and exacerbate the very behavior that was
complained about in the first instance.
Kara E. Nelson, Comment, The Release of Juvenile Records Under Wisconsin's Juvenile Justice
Code: A New System of False Promises, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 1101, 1149-53 (1998) (author reporting,
but not agreeing with, what proponents of confidentiality argue).
213. See Mack, supra note 161, at 104.
214. Paul N. Schaeffer, Pennsylvania's Juvenile Court Law, 14 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 253, 260
(1943).
215. Judge George W. Smyth, The Juvenile Court and Delinquent Parents, 13 FED. PROBATION
12, 12 (1949).
216. Geis, supra note 193, at 101; see also Roger J. Waybright, Florida's New Juvenile Court
Act, 6 MIAMI L. Q. 1 (1951); Helen S. MacPherson, The Juvenile Court in Connecticut, II CONN. B.
J. 231 (1937) (treating the dependency aspects of juvenile court more fully and independently, while
still viewing the juvenile court as one created primarily for delinquency problems).
217. See Thomas, supra note 149, at 312.
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the United States Children's Bureau.2 In 1935, The Aid to Dependent
Children program was established to provide states with federal funds
(on a matching basis) to help support children in single parent homes.1 9
The Act also encouraged states to develop protective programs for chil-
dren who were dependent or neglected and, consistent with the philoso-
phy of juvenile court, for children "in danger of becoming delinquent.,
220
In 1962 amendments to the Social Security Act required states to adopt
plans extending child protective services to "every political
subdivision.,, 22 ' By 1967 every state had passed some form of a child
abuse reporting bill.222 The 1974 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act 223 further encouraged states to enact mandatory reporting laws. In
addition, the 1974 Act provided funding and model legislation.224 States
responded by developing procedures for investigating child abuse and
neglect and creating "the government entity known as child protective
services. ' 2  In the late 1970s Congress held hearings on the concern that
children adjudged dependent because of neglect, abuse or abandonment
were being left in foster care for years.226 The hearings resulted in the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA),227 which
emphasized family preservation and keeping children in their homes if
possible. Then in 1997, Congress passed the Adoption and Safe Families
Act of 1997 (ASFA), 228 an act that emphasized finding adoptive homes
for those children who would not successfully be returned to their par-
ents.229 Today, dependency court proceedings are no longer mere adjuncts
to delinquency prevention; they are a separate and significant part of
juvenile court designed to protect children from neglect and abuse. They
retain, however, one of the early and primary characteristics of juvenile
delinquency hearings: they are presumptively closed to the public.
The history of dependency proceedings, extending from its Poor
Law origins in England to today's modern child protective proceedings,
does not reflect a "virtually immemorial custom '230 of either closed or
218. See LEROY ASHBY, ENDANGERED CHILDREN. DEPENDENCY. NEGLECT AND ABUSE IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 189 (1997).
219. See Thomas, supra note 149, at 313; Walling & Debele, supra note 184, at 799.
220. Thomas, supra note 149, at 313 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-626 (1970)).
221. Walling & Debele, supra note 184, at 799 n. 132 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 625 (1970)).
222. See PLECK, supra note 183, at 173; see also Walling & Debele, supra note 184, at 801.
223. 42 U.S.C. § 5102 (1974).
224. See id. § 5102.
225. Mary B. Lamer, Carol S. Stevenson & Richard E. Behrman, Protecting Children from
Abuse and Neglect: Analysis and Recommendations, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 4, 8 (Richard E.
Behrman, M.D. ed., 1998).
226. Id.
227. 42 U.S.C. § 620 et seq. (1980).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 678 (1997).
229. See Cristine H. Kim, Note, Putting Reason Back Into the Reasonable Efforts Requirement
in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 287, 309-310 (1999).
230. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 555, 593 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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open proceedings, as does the history of open trials generally.23' The Poor
Laws seemed not concerned with confidentiality, stigma, or any matters
relevant to protecting children, with the exception of providing poor re-
lief. The English Court of Chancery also seemed not concerned with
protecting children at the outset. When it began to show broader concern
for the child's welfare, however, evidence suggests some hearings were
probably held in private.
In this country, although the evidence is not absolute, it appears
that, while dependency-type hearings sometimes may have been held
away from full public access, closed courtrooms were not an articulated
mandate for delinquency or dependency-type proceedings until at least
the late 1800s and, more likely, until the juvenile court began to establish
itself in the first part of the 1900s. Even then, the confidentiality practice
was motivated by proceedings concerned with delinquency. The protec-
tive dependency hearing of today had not yet emerged as a focus of most
juvenile courts.
The history of closure for dependency hearings then, is not only
relatively recent, but, in America, is also largely rooted in its affiliation
with juvenile delinquency proceedings. That the practice had some ori-
gins in England, that it began in America over one hundred years ago,
and that it has continued in dependency court despite its American ori-
gins being primarily anchored in delinquency proceedings, certainly
speaks to the historical judgment. But this history, contrasted with the
"virtually immemorial" and "abiding adherence to the principle of open
trials" considered in Richmond and its related cases, does not reflect any
"profound judgment about the way in which" dependency hearings
should be conducted.232 Further, while historical judgment informs, it
does not dictate. Looking at the functional role access might play today
remains critical. As Justice Brennan stated in Richmond, "what is crucial
... is whether access to a particular government process is important in
terms of that very process. 233
III. FUNCTION: IS PUBLIC ACCESS TO DEPENDENCY COURT IMPORTANT
TODAY?
The composition of juvenile court varies from state to state, but
usually includes delinquency cases, status offense cases and dependency
cases. 234 Delinquency cases, which tend to give juvenile court its identity,
involve children who violate the law and who, but for their age, would be
231. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 593 (Brennan, J., concurring).
232. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
233. Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
234. See Carol S. Stevenson, et. al., The Juvenile Court: Analysis and Recommendations, in
THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: THE JUVENILE COURT 4, 6 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D. ed., 1996).
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charged with criminal offenses."' Status offenses involve children who
have committed acts that are not illegal for adults, but are made so for
children, such as truancy, running away, and violating curfew.236 Delin-
quency and status offenses involve some act of wrongdoing on the part
of the juvenile. Dependency cases, on the other hand, involve situations
where children are believed to be victims of neglect or abuse and the
state moves to protect those children by bringing an action in depend-
ency court.237
A usual dependency case arises from a report of neglect or abuse.
Neglect occurs when a child's parents or guardians fail to provide even
minimal care for the child, including abandonment. Abuse can be physi-
cal or sexual. Once a report has been made, the state's child welfare or
child protective agency determines if an investigation is warranted. 238 If
so, and if the case is substantiated, that is if there is "good reason" to
suspect abuse and neglect, further action is taken.239 In most cases, the
child agency deals informally with the family, without a court petition or
235. See id. at 6, 7; Howard N. Snyder, The Juvenile Court and Delinquency Cases, in THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN: THE JUVENILE COURT 53, 53-58 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D. ed., 1996).
Instead of being charged criminally and tried for their crimes, juveniles are charged with committing
a delinquent act and the court is asked to "adjudicate" them as delinquent. Whereas adults are
sentenced and imprisoned, juveniles are committed and provided "treatment" so that they can be
rehabilitated. Id. at 58; Siegel & Senna, supra note 166, at 8. The court's disposition can include
residential placement (detention facilities), restitution, community service, fines or probation, or the
court can "dismiss the case in consideration of actions already taken." Id. Residential placement can
range from placement in a large custodial institution such as a state training school, to a group home
to a wilderness program or boot camp. See Peter W. Greenwood, Responding to Juvenile Crime:
Lessons Learned, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: THE JUVENILE COURT 75, 79-81 (Richard E.
Behrman, M.D. ed., 1996). Further, state laws vary, but courts generally lose jurisdiction for
purposes of disposition when the juvenile reaches a certain age. It is usually 18 or 21, but in some
states it can extend past age 30. See Snyder. supra at 58-59; Spring, supra note 178, at 1352 n.5.
Whether a juvenile court has jurisdiction to begin with varies widely from state to state, but often
involves a consideration of several factors, including age, type of crime committed, and whether it is
a first offense or not. See Eric K. Klein, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role
of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 390 (1998); Zierdt,
supra note 36, at 416 n.109.
236. See Stevenson, supra note 234, at 13 (discussing that status offenses can also include
underage drinking and children who are "ungovernable"). Delinquent behavior is often preceded by
status offenses, and today we would think of status offenses as "predelinquent" behavior. See James
W. Payne, Our Children's Destiny, 35 TRIAL 83, 85 n.4 (1999). Many of the status offense
problems, "as many as 80% of all cases," are addressed primarily through diversion and dealt with
through community service programs or the school system and are not formally a part of the court
caseload. See Stevenson, supra note 234, at 13; David J. Steinhart, Status Offenses, in THE FUTURE
OF CHILDREN: THE JUVENILE COURT 86, 88 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D. ed., 1996). Examples of
dispositional alternatives for status offenders, in addition to commitment, include probation,
community service, fines, and canceling the juvenile's driver's license. See Erin M. Smith, In a
Child's Best Interest: Juvenile Status Offenders Deserve Procedural Due Process, 10 LAW & INEQ.
253, 784 n.75 (1992).
237. See Stevenson, supra note 234. at 15-16.
238. See id.
239. Richard P. Barth, The Juvenile Court and Dependency Cases, in THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN: THE JUVENILE COURT 100, 101 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D. ed., 1996).
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court oversight.2' ° In essence, the agency "offers voluntary services," and
the family "agrees" to those services. 24' When this does not work, how-
ever, the agency files a petition, initiating the court's jurisdiction.24'
Dependency cases are usually heard in juvenile court, although
more recently states with family courts have placed juvenile and, thus,
dependency proceedings there.243 Once a petition is filed, the court is
charged with several tasks, primary of which are making sure the child is
protected and seeking a permanent home for the child, either with the
child's family or elsewhere.2"
To evaluate the functional role public access might play in the "par-
ticular government process" we are concerned with (today's dependency
court), it is important first to look at the current state of the court. Com-
mentators and scholars, almost en masse, characterize juvenile court,
including dependency court, as overcrowded, under funded, and failing
to protect adequately the children who are subject to its rule of closure.
Further, understanding something of the legal, procedural and substan-
tive requirements in neglect and abuse cases provides some appreciation
for the scope of the dependency court's responsibilities and, thus, the
characterizations of failure. The issues the courts must deal with are
many and are complicated, the hearings are frequent and the number of
participants is considerable. Dependency courts devote much of their
efforts to just getting through the docket. Time for thoughtful considera-
tion of issues is rare. Finally, an understanding of the culture of depend-
ency court is important. The cultural dynamics, largely defined by the
emotional issues with which the courts deal, the imbalance of power
between the parties, and the informal but ingrained customs of the regu-
lar participants, characterize the system. All of this gives form to the
particular government process of dependency court.
A. The Current State of Dependency Court
Juvenile court, including its dependency proceedings, is, by most ac-
counts, a dismal mess. First, the workload is simply too great and the
resources too meager for court personnel to adequately protect the chil-
dren. Second, too many juvenile court personnel are untrained for or
240. Stevenson, supra note 234, at 16-17.
241. Barth, supra note 239, at 101.
242. See id.
243. Stevenson, supra note 234, at 6; H. Ted Rubin, The Nature of the Court Today, in THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN: THE JUVENILE COURT 40 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D. ed., 1996); Hon.
Leonard P. Edwards, The Future of the Juvenile Court: Promising New Directions, in THE FUTURE
OF CHILDREN: THE JUVENILE COURT 131, 132-33 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D. ed., 1996); Justice
Frank Sullivan, Jr., Unified Family Court Structure Recommended, 42 REs GESTAE 28, 28-29
(1998). Statutes usually create both juvenile courts and family courts. Rubin, supra, at 41. Most of
the literature addresses abuse and neglect cases assuming they are heard in juvenile court. As
discussed earlier, juvenile court was designed to include what has now become dependency court.
244. See infra Part III.B.
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uninterested in their work. Finally, the court and its work are often held
in low esteem, sometimes even by those who work there, and turnover of
personnel is great.
The juvenile court must oversee too many cases with complex is-
sues and must do so with far from adequate resources. One source re-
ports that Chicago judges who hear dependency matters have up to 3000
cases at any given time.24 5 "[F]rustrations of being responsible for an
unmanageable number of cases" can lead judges to "eventually stop
seeing respondent parents as individuals. 246 As a result, judges can end
up doing their jobs with resigned attitudes produced by the seeming im-
possibility of their task. "In this overburdened system, then, an effective
lawyer . . . is essential to making [the] client's circumstances fully
known to and understood by the court., 247 Unfortunately, that part of the
system also is overburdened: children's lawyers in Chicago, for example,
represent an average of 350 children each; 24 8 "reporters have compared
hearings in the overwhelmed juvenile courts to cattle calls. 2 49 Further, it
is not just the judges and lawyers who are overloaded. The rest of the
system looks the same. "Every facet of the child welfare system is now
overburdened. Social workers and their supervisors regularly handle
more cases than recommended by licensing organizations: in some juris-
dictions, more than four times more."'
245. Laura Duncan, State's Attorney's Office Adds 20 Lawyers for Surging Abuse and Neglect
Caseload, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 24, 1994, at 1.
246. Kathleen A. Bailie, Note, The Other "Neglected" Parties in Child Protective Proceedings:
Parents in Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2285,
2313 (1998). See also Thomas F. Geraghty, Justice for Children: How Do We Get There?, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 190, 232 (1997) (In delinquency court, "[hligh caseloads pressure
children, prosecutors, defense lawyers and judges to gloss over relevant facts, to ignore possible
defenses, and to avoid the kind of attention to detail that makes for accurate determinations of
fact.").
247. Bailie, supra note 246, at 2313.
248. Steve Johnson & Colin McMahon, Year's Toll: Our Loss, Our Failure 61 Young Victims
Leave Behind a Trail of Anger, Abuse & Blame, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 2, 1994 (available in 1994 WL
6536741).
249. Gordon, supra note 17, at 679.
250. Id. See also Geraghty, supra note 246, at 232 (Juvenile courts everywhere "struggle with
[a] lack of resources and [an] inability to obtain meaningful services for children."). Massachusetts,
for example, passed a court reform act directed at improving "a fragmented [juvenile court system]
nearly strangled by an ever increasing caseload of matters involving more complex and demanding
issues of family dysfunction." Five years later, the system "remain[ed] under funded: the lack of
resources for adequate courthouse facilities and court personnel contributes to docket delays and
severely limits the ability to address serious family needs." Gavin, supra note 14, at 15-16. New
York's child protective system was described by Judge Elaine Slobod: not enough foster parents, not
enough trained aides and caseworkers in child protective services, inadequate mental health services
for children, only intermittent services for families to help them keep their children - in short, there
is not the "necessary services and resources" needed. In re S Children, 532 N.Y.S.2d 192, 198-199
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1988). See also Marcia Sprague & Mark Hardin, Coordination of Juvenile and
Criminal Court Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 239, 293 (1997)
(arguing that coordination of juvenile and criminal proceedings resulting from a single incident can,
in part, increase court efficiency).
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Professor Weinstein described how this overload plays out within
the juvenile court system for dependency cases:
[H]eavy calendars . . . require cases to be moved through quickly.
There is no time for thorough and careful consideration of all the
facts and concerns. Giving too much time to any one case disrupts the
entire calendar. Neither the judges nor the attorneys can be com-
pletely familiar with these cases because of the number of cases
which they handle.... The caseloads maintained by most profession-
als working in these systems is too high to expect quality perform-
ance .... It is not unusual to see judges reading through case files
during the presentation of the case, nor to have critical reports dis-
tributed on the day of the hearing. In ordinary litigation, that would
be sufficient reason for delay. In these cases, however, each cause for
delay means that a child's life is put on hold.
The work of attorneys, too, is impacted by high caseloads. Attorneys
may be unable to investigate their cases, consult with experts, or pre-
pare for hearings. It is typical for cases to settle just before a sched-
uled hearing, not because the parties suddenly discovered a way to re-
solve their differences, but simply because this may be the first time
all of the attorneys have had the opportunity to discuss the case with
each other....
High caseloads prevent social workers from designing case-specific
services for families, as required by [federal law]; instead, families
often receive "boilerplate" service plans which can add to, rather than
alleviate the families' problems, waste valuable resources and time,
and heighten levels of frustration for all participants....
Support services for families are very limited .... In the child protec-
tion arena, services are mandated by ... federal requirement[s] ...
but are underfunded and often inadequate or unavailable to families
251
due to long waiting lists or inconvenient locations.
Kathi Grasso, testifying in Congressional Hearings in 1997 on be-
half of the American Bar Association Center on Children and the Law,
reported that "emergency removal hearings, foster care review hearings,
and other pertinent court reviews [too often] last no longer than five or
,,25210 minutes. The Report of the ABA's Working Group on the Unmet
Legal Needs of Children and Their Families states that "Chicago juvenile
251. Weinstein, supra note 29, at 118-121.
252. Juvenile Court Improvement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 25, 28 (1997) (statement of Kathi L. Grasso,
American Bar Association Center on Children and the Law, on behalf of the American Bar
Association).
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court judges have about ten minutes to devote to each case." 253 These are
not descriptions that evoke confidence.
Given these working conditions, it is not surprising that the juvenile
court sits at the bottom of most judicial hierarchies. Whether the court's
lack of resources is responsible for the court's low status or vice versa,
the result is the same. 54 Many judges and other personnel are discour-
aged from coming to and staying in juvenile courts. There are good and
dedicated judges, lawyers and other personnel in juvenile court - this
author has seen them - but many are ready to leave it and its many
problems. Turnover of juvenile court personnel is high and is one of the
biggest obstacles to protecting children within the system.25
Second, although many have interest, not all personnel in juvenile
court have adequate training and desire:
[M]ost jurisdictions choose attorneys for children in child protection
proceedings merely because the attorneys have expressed an interest
in representing children; many of these attorneys bring to this task no
special training in child advocacy and consequently may, despite
good efforts and intentions, provide less than optimal representation
to children.256
Some lack even minimum qualifications: "In some jurisdictions, where
juvenile courts are regarded as legally unsophisticated, judges are ap-
pointed to juvenile court who wouldn't be trusted to judge major civil or
criminal cases. 257 Others simply do not have the interest: "Attorneys
often accept appointments to specialized juvenile courts hoping for later
promotion to higher judicial positions., 25 8 All of these scenarios result in
253. America's Children at Risk: A National Agenda for Legal Action, 3 Ky. CHILDREN'S RTS.
J. 18,22 (1994).
254. See Joshua M. Dalton, At the Crossroads of Richmond and Gault: Addressing Media
Access to Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings Through A Functional Analysis, 28 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1155, 1181 n.172 (1998) ("The juvenile court generally ranks low in state judiciary hierarchy;
this [too] keeps many qualified judges away.") "Many juvenile courts have meager staff support and
other resources. This is probably due to their lack of visibility within the court system, a lack of
understanding of their unique characteristics, their typically low position in the judicial hierarchy,
and the low regard in which they are held by the judiciary as a whole." Mark Hardin, Child
Protection Cases in a Unified Family Court, 32 FAM. L. Q. 147, 197 (1998).
255. See Katharine Cahn & Paul Johnson, Reaching Timely Permanency Decisions: A
Recapitulation, in CHILDREN CAN'T WAIT: REDUCING DELAYS IN OUT-OF-HOME CARE 129, 135
(Katharine Cahn & Paul Johnson eds., 1993).
256. Annette R. Appell, Responses to the Conference: Decontextualizing the Child Client: The
Efficacy of the Attorney-Client Model for Very Young Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1955, 1968
(1996). "[Tlhe poor quality of some legal representation of children has been linked to low
compensation .... high caseloads, and judicial concerns about the impact of hourly payment of
these attorneys on courts' coffers." Id. at 1967.
257. Hardin, supra note 254, at 197.
258. Id.
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personnel who lack the necessary commitment and training to discharge
their responsibilities to the children committed to dependency court. 9
The low esteem in which juvenile court is held is reflected in other
ways too. "Many juvenile courts ... are old and dilapidated or located in
the basement of the local courthouse. The physical appearance of the
courts often reflects their [low] position within the court system.' '260 In
addition, "[i]n many jurisdictions, specialized juvenile court judges or
referees draw the lowest judicial salaries. 26'
B. The Responsibilities of Dependency Court
Dependency courts are responsible for a much greater number of de-
262
pendency proceedings today than they were twenty-five years ago. In
1976, there were 10 reports of abuse or neglect per 10,000 children; in
1994, there were more than 40 reports per 10,000 children, numbers to-
taling four percent of America's children.263 The real impact on work-
load, however, has come from the increased scope of responsibilities in
the typical abuse or neglect case, and most of that comes from the re-
quirements of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
(AACWA)26 and the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA).265
These federal acts, along with some additional state and constitutional
requirements, have resulted in a greater complexity of issues and an in-
creased number of hearings. Finally, an increased number of participants
in dependency cases has also contributed to the system overload. 2"
As discussed earlier, the usual dependency case starts with a report
of neglect or abuse.267 While sexual and severe physical abuse cases tend
to be those cases the public hears about, the majority of cases are neglect
259.
Advocates for children, be they prosecutors or defense lawyers, repeatedly have their
efforts undermined by inefficient, ill-informed, or downright hostile judges. Judges who
want to make a difference find themselves hamstrung by lawyers and child welfare
personnel who are not as knowledgeable or as committed as they should be.
Geraghty, supra note 246, at 234. See also Appell, supra note 256, at 1968 (commenting on the
lack of training child advocates have).
260. Hardin, supra note 254, at 197.
261. Id.
262. See Stevenson, supra note 234, at 16; Barth, supra note 239, at 102.
263. Barth, supra note 239, at 102. All states require certain professionals who serve children to
"report suspected child abuse" to the proper authorities. Stevenson, supra note 234, at 15-16. Of
these 2.9 million children on whom reports are made, "[n]early one half' were reported as neglected;
twenty-six percent as victims of physical abuse; and fourteen percent as victims of sexual abuse. Id.
at 16. See also Barth, supra, at 239.
264. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C., primarily in 42 U.S.C.).
265. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C., primarily in 42 U.S.C.).
266. See Hardin, supra note 30, at 113-20.
267. See Stevenson, supra note 234, at 16.
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situations. 26' The state's child protective agency investigates the report
and, assuming the report is substantiated, takes appropriate action, which
may include filing a petition in state court. 69 Prior to AACWA in 1980, a
judge in a dependency proceeding was charged primarily with deter-
mining whether child abuse or neglect had occurred and deciding
whether the child could stay in the home with agency supervision, or
whether the child needed an out-of-home placement (foster care). Two
hearings were involved in the usual case.27 ° Since 1980, however, the
courts are responsible for much more. "The Child Welfare Act
[AACWA] tripled the number of issues to which lawyers and judges
must attend in juvenile court proceedings. 27'
AACWA came about in part from the criticism that children were
being placed in foster homes when, with state-provided support services,
they might have been able to stay safely in their homes.7  AACWA re-
sponded by shifting emphasis to "permanency planning" for children, so
they would not languish in foster homes. 273 The centerpiece of the Act's
permanency planning mandate was the "reasonable efforts"
requirement. States were now required to provide support services to
make "reasonable efforts" to maintain or reunite the child's in home-
placement by providing services to the family, thus maintaining the sta-
275bility and permanency of that placement. Instead of emphasizing foster
care placement as a means of protecting abused or neglected children, the
Act shifted the focus to protecting the child while the child remained in
his or her home; foster care was to be the "last resort," not the first. "76
To carry out AACWA's reasonable efforts provision, states were
277required to develop a case plan for each child in foster care. Each
child's plan was to detail what had been done to try to keep the child in
his or her home: the foster care placement; the services to be provided to
the child, the foster family and the child's family; and the plans for re-
turning the child to his or her home or another permanent placement.
278
"A typical case plan specifies case goals, such as family reunification,
and areas of parental improvement; agency and parental tasks needed to
268. See English, supra note 33, at 43-46.
269. See Stevenson, supra note 234, at 16-17. See also Barth. supra note 239, at 101.
270. See Hardin, supra note 30, at 112-13.
271. Gordon, supra note 17, at 679.
272. See Kim, supra note 229, at 287-89. The emphasis was on protecting children by placing
them in foster homes, as was the focus of federal funding. After congressional hearings on the foster
care system in the late 1970s the AACWA legislation was passed.
273. See id. at 288-89. Permanency advocates emphasized stability and finding permanent
homes for children. The widespread use of long-term "temporary" placement, foster homes, was the
antithesis of permanency. See also Hardin. supra note 30, at 112.
274. See Kim, supra note 229. at 289-90.
275. See id.
276. Id. at 290 n.22 (quoting 126 CONG. REC. 6942 (1980)).
277. See id. at 290.
278. See id.
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achieve the goals; and timetables for the achievement of the identified
goals and tasks. 279
AACWA also increased the number of court hearings required for
most dependency cases. States were required to judicially review the
child agency's actions to see if there were "reasonable efforts" to keep
the child with the family28° and to conduct periodic administrative or ju-
dicial review hearings for children in foster placements "to determine,
among other things, the appropriateness of the placement, the extent of
case progress, and compliance with the [child's] case plan."28' In addi-
tion, state courts were required to hold permanency planning hearings (so
that a new permanent home could be "secured" for children for whom
reunification with families was not a safe option) within eighteen months
after foster care placement.
2
Then in 1997, additional federal legislation was added. While
AACWA was prompted in large part by children "languishing" in foster
homes,283 the Act did not necessarily remedy the foster care problem.28
The states had interpreted the Act's reasonable efforts provision as re-
quiring them to work towards reuniting children with families, even
'85when there was little or no prospect of that becoming a safe placement.
As a result children were kept in foster homes while fruitless efforts were
expended to make their former homes safe for them.8 6 When Congress
passed ASFA in 1997, then, it attempted to clarify and limit the reason-
287able efforts requirement. It did so in various ways, primarily, however,
by shifting greater emphasis to the child's safety and to permanency, as
opposed to family preservation and reunification. 2 8 ASFA specifically
emphasizes finding adoptive homes for those children who will not suc-
cessfully be returned to their parents89 Consistent with these goals,ASFA also requires a permanency hearing within twelve months after a
279. Hardin, supra note 30, at 114.
280. See id. at 112-13,119.
281. Id. at 114, 120. See also Kim, supra note 229, at 291 (explaining periodic reviews).
282. Hardin, supra note 30, at 114, 120. See Kim, supra note 229, at 312 (explaining change to
requirements for permanency hearings from eighteen months after placement in foster care under
AACWA to twelve months under ASFA). As of 1996, however, at least 21 states had sued child
welfare agencies on behalf of children who had not received the benefits of permanency planning
envisioned by this law. See also Stevenson, supra note 234, at 17.
283. Jill Chaifetz, Listening To Foster Children in Accordance with the Law: The Failure to
Serve Children in State Care, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 4-5 (1999).
284. See Kim, supra note 229, at 287.
285. See id. at 287-89, 309.
286. See id.
287. See id. at 287.
288. See id. at 309 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(I 5)(A) (West Supp. 1998)).
289. See id. at 309-10. In addition, specific limitations on reasonable efforts to keep intact or
reunite families were enacted. For example, states are no longer required to meet the reasonable
efforts requirement for family reunification if there are "aggravated circumstances" (e.g., torture or
sexual abuse), if a parent murders another child, or if a parent loses his or her parental rights to a
sibling. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) (Supp. IV 1998).
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child enters foster care (as opposed to eighteen months under AACWA)
and moves states more quickly towards initiating termination of parental
rights hearings (to facilitate adoptions).29
The requirements of AACWA in 1980, combined with those of
ASFA in 1997 have significantly expanded the courts' responsibilities in
dependency actions in the last twenty to thirty years. 9' Today's depend-
ency court, in addition to determining the validity of abuse or neglect
allegations, may need to determine emergency placement issues, assess
reasonable efforts to keep the child in the home,293 assess reasonable ef-
forts to get the child back in the home, review case plans, review imple-
mentation efforts of case plans, hold (more quickly) a hearing to termi-
nate parental rights, and deal with adoption issues. 94 "In 1976, the same
case might have had two hearings and two issues for the court to deal
with. Today the court might have to hold an emergency hearing, several
review hearings, several permanency planning hearings, a parental rights
termination hearing, and an adoption hearing. 295
Adding further to the complexity of cases with which juvenile de-
pendency court must deal is the increased number of persons, including
lawyers, needed or required to participate in the hearings. Federal and
state constitutional and statutory requirements regulate who is repre-
sented in child dependency proceedings and at what stage.296 First, the
child's interests must be represented. The Child Abuse and Neglect Pre-
vention and Treatment Act of 1974 (CAPTA) requires the appointment
of a guardian ad litem (GAL) for each child who is the subject of a child
297protection proceeding. While the GAL does not have to be a lawyer,
many states provide lawyers to children.9  The rest of the states use
Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASAs) or other laypersons. 299Some children have both a lawyer and a GAL.399
290. See Kim, supra note 229, at 309-14. Even in 1996, prior to ASFA, Mark Hardin reported
an increase in termination proceedings resulting from "[t]he emphasis on finding permanent families
for foster children who cannot safely be returned home." Hardin, supra note 30. at 115.
291. See Hardin, supra note 30. at 114. See also Hardin, supra note 254, at 154-60.
292. Stevenson, supra note 234, at 17.
293. Hardin, supra note 30, at 113.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 116. See also Kim, supra note 229, at 302 (describing the shelter care hearing,
adjudicatory hearing, dispositional hearing and review hearing typical of the juvenile court process).
296. See generally Hardin, supra note 30, at 118-19.
297. Id.; Daniella Levine, To Assert Children's Legal Rights or Promote Children's Needs:
How to Attain Both Goals, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2023, 2025 (1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107
(1998 & Supp. 1994)).
298. Emily Buss, Confronting Developmental Barriers to the Empowerment of Child Clients,
84 CORNELL L. REV. 895, 900 n.12 (1999) (citing Donald N. Duquette & Sarah H. Ramsey,
Representation of Children in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: An Empirical Look at What
Constitutes Effective Representation, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 341, 346-47 (1987)).
299. Richard J. Gelles & Ira Schwartz, Children and the Child Welfare System, 2 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 95, 108 (1999) ("[Imn only half of the states ... do children in dependency actions have
attorneys. In the other half ... children are represented either by [CASA or laypersons.]") (citing
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Next, the interests of the parents must be represented. In each case
that involves termination of parental rights the court must determine
301whether the parents have a constitutional right to legal representation.
However, most states give parents the right to request or the court the
discretion to appoint counsel' 0° Fewer, but still most, states give parents
the right to request or the court the discretion to appoint counsel at all
103stages in child dependency cases. In some cases separate counsel repre-sents each parent.3t '
While in theory lawyers assist the court in substantive and proce-
dural matters, this is not always the case. Inadequate training of juvenile
court personnel, high employee turnover, inadequate pay, and status is-
sues influence the outcome.3 5 CASA volunteers, either serving as GALs
or as an additional voice for the child, enjoy a deserved reputation for
their contributions to ensuring that the child's interests are represented.
However, "they generally offer neither expertise (training is good, but
does not turn volunteers into social workers or psychologists) nor a par-
ticularly intimate knowledge of the child."3°6 In addition, while lawyers
and GALs theoretically ensure that the interests of the parties are repre-
sented, representation of varied interests can also make for a more adver-
sarial hearing, and thus increase the court's workload.
Lawyers or representatives, along with other participants have
changed the look of the dependency case. In 1976, a dependency pro-
Interview with Howard Davidson, Director of the American Bar Association Center on Children and
the Law (Feb. 1999)).
300. Hardin, supra note 30, at 118-19; Levine, supra note 297, at 2025.
301. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32 (1981) (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778, 790 (1973)).
302. Hardin, supra note 30, at 118 ("[l]n some states the right to counsel originates only with
procedures to terminate parental rights"). See also Indigents' Rights to State Funding in Civil
Actions, 95 HARV. L. REV. 132, 142 n.82 (1981) ("Lassiter may have little practical effect on the
provision of counsel in termination proceedings. . . .Most states have statute[s] authorizing
appointment of counsel."); Amy Sinden, 'Why Won't Mom Cooperate?': A Critique of Informality in
Child Welfare Proceedings, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 348-49 (1999) (citing WASH. REV.
CODE 13.34.090 (1998); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 6337 (West 1992)).
303. William Wesly Patton, It Matters Not What is but What Might Have Been: The Standard
of Appellate Review for Denial of Counsel in Child Dependency and Parental Severance Trials, 12
WHITTIER L. REV. 537, 539 (1990). See also Rosalie R. Young, The Right to Appointed Counsel in
Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings: The States' Response to Lassiter, 14 ToURO L. REV.
247, 262 (1997) (explaining that ten states currently "require the appointment of counsel for indigent
parents" in termination cases "absent an intelligent waiver," while "[tiwenty-two ... states and the
District of Columbia require that counsel be appointed" if the "parent requests counsel and meets
local standards for indigence").
304. See e.g., John Haney & Lisa Kay, Making Reasonable Efforts in Iowa Foster Care Cases:
An Empirical Analysis, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1629, 1650 n.140 (1996) ("In some cases, the court will
appoint separate attorneys for each parent when their interests conflict.").
305. Hardin, supra note 30, at 118-19.
306. Buss, supra note 298, at 954 n.191.
307. Bailie, supra note 246, at 2310 (citing Weinstein, supra note 29). See generally Hardin,
supra note 30, at 118-19.
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ceeding typically included only the caseworker and the custodial
parents.) Today, participants might include the caseworker, the custo-
dial parents, the noncustodial parents, the parents' attorney or attorneys,
the child's attorney, the child protective agency's attorney, a CASA vol-
unteer (acting as a GAL) and even foster parents. 309
Increased caseloads, increased complexity of cases, and inadequate
resources, including personnel, and the resulting overload and ineffec-
tiveness of dependency courts are all important to understanding the
"particular government process" of dependency court. However, one
must understand another aspect of the court in order to evaluate the rela-
tive costs of open versus closed proceedings; perhaps more than any-
thing, the culture most characterizes the institution of dependency court.
C. The Culture of Dependency Court
The government wields enormous power in dependency court.3 ° It
takes children away from their parents, and often thrusts children "into
strange surroundings with perhaps no understanding of why this trau-
matic event is happening or when it might end.""' At the same time, the
government deprives the parents of the "liberty to direct and control
[their] care and upbringing."32 Further, while the parents and children are
usually strangers to the dependency court, the other participants are not.
The judge, the lawyers, the social workers, the GALs, and the other court
workers are usually daily participants in dependency court. The familiar-
ity that these court workers have with the system and with each other can
breed a "go along to get along" philosophy that pressures not only the
regular participants, but also the parents and thus their children to con-
form and comply. The culture that results is one that does not always
encourage thorough and accurate fact-finding or thoughtful decisions
about the important matters before the court.
It is important to grasp the nature of a dependency action. "A de-
pendency case ... pits parent against state."3 '3 "[I]t is no secret that the
people affected by the child welfare system are some of the least power-
ful members of our society: women, many of whom belong to racial mi-
nority groups and virtually all of whom are desperately poor," 114 and
children. Further, it is possible that neither mother nor child will have a
lawyer. If they do have lawyers, it is likely the lawyers are not highly
308. Hardin, supra note 30, at 115.
309. Id.
310. In re Welfare of R.L.K., 269 N.W.2d 367, 368 (Minn. 1978).
311. Sinden, supra note 302, at 363.
312. Id. at 362.
313. Id. at 346.
314. Id. at 364-65. See also Sokol, supra note 28, at 917 ("[Tihe parents who end up in
dependency court frequently are drawn from the most powerless segments of our society.") (citing
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 30
(1981)).
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trained or experienced. This is in spite of the fact that the government is
there to take or interfere with the parent's right to direct the upbringing
of her child. The Supreme Court's language in Stanley v. Illinois35 con-
cerning this right bears repeating:
The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed
,essential,' . . . 'basic civil rights of man,' . . . and '(r)ights far more
precious... than property rights,' .... 'It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obliga-
tions the state can neither supply nor hinder.'... The integrity of the
family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . .. the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment .... and the Ninth Amendment.
16
The government, through the dependency court judge, has the
power to deny parents this precious right. The judge has the ultimate
power to terminate the child's legal relationship with his or her parents.317
The result is that the government presides over a critical court proceed-
ing that is initiated by the government against a poor and vulnerable pri-
vate party.
In addition, all the participants in this proceeding, except the parent• • 318
and the child, are regular dependency court participants. The repeat
presence of these individuals fosters a "clubbiness" and contributes to the
court's informality, both of which can influence the dynamics and the
results of the hearings.319 First, the regulars in dependency court know
each other. They know each other's children, partners and lives. When
people know each other well and see each other regularly, they develop
"a set of unwritten rules and shared expectations that govern the ex-
pected and accepted behavior., 320 Theoretically, this familiarity, "learn-
ing each other's styles, understanding expectations, and developing
trust," could work to the advantage of the court system, "but only if each
participant is vigilant in monitoring the professional behavior of
315. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
316. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (quoting Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Skinner v.
Okla., 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953); Prince v. Mass., 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
317. See Brelsford & Myers, supra note 3, at 16 (citing In re Tarshawn J. and Carlos V., Nos.
71752, 69605, Reporter's Trans. at 9-11 (Cal. Super. Ct., Fresno Cty., June 25, 1991).
318. Sinden, supra note 302, at 351-52.
319. Id. at 352-55. See Bremner, supra note 145, Vol. 1I at 1162-65, for an excellent
discussion of this dynamic.
320. Sinden, supra note 302, at 352 ("[F]rom the lawyers and social workers to the judges, their
courtroom deputies, stenographers and clerks - [all] have well-established relationships and a kind
of collegiality that comes from daily contact."). See also Bremner, supra note 145, Vol. III at 1162-
65.
[Vol. 79:1
PUBLIC ACCESS TO DEPENDENCY COURT
others. ' 2' Instead of vigilance, however, this clubbiness too often en-
courages judges, lawyers, and others to place collegiality and relation-
ships ahead of their responsibilities. They conform to the group's expec-
tations and make implicit pacts of non-aggression. 2  This is especially
true because of the tremendous caseloads in dependency court. "Giving
too much time to any one case disrupts the entire calendar. 3 23 Lawyers
and other court workers understand this and understand that raising trou-
blesome issues or arguments will consume time and resources that are
simply not available. 4 This may be particularly true of attorneys ap-
pointed by the court under a contract system.3 2' Again, because of the
limited resources allocated to dependency court, the pay under these
is . 326contracts is inadequate compensation given the services they require.
Still, "the attorney must agree to these demands or risk receiving no fu-
ture appointments .... The judge is clearly in a dominant position ...
because the judge has control over whether the attorney may appear in
the courtroom in the first place.
3 27
The familiarity with which these regular courtroom participants
interact also contributes to what is already a purposeful atmosphere of
informality in juvenile dependency proceedings . 2 8 This informality cre-
ates yet another obstacle to the court fulfilling its responsibility. Formal,
open court adversarial proceedings are associated with relevant and accu-
rate fact-finding.329 While even formal court proceedings can include
decisions based on prejudices and other factual inaccuracies, informal
proceedings exacerbate these problems. Without formal constraints, de-
cision-making is more "susceptible to being swayed by prejudices,
stereotypes, and snap judgments based on innuendo and rumor. ' ' 310 Simi-
larly, part of the informality of dependency court is influenced by the
"social work norms and discourse" that dominate.' Social work norms
discourage conflict and emphasize cooperation and non-adversarial
means of resolving issues. Amy Sinden, a lawyer who has represented
parents in dependency court, argues persuasively that these values oper-
321. Shari F. Shink, Hallmarks: New Directions in the Defense of Children, 26 CoLo. LAW. 39,
40(1997).
322. Sinden, supra note 302, at 354-55.
323. Weinstein, supra note 29, at 118.
324. Id.
325. Shink, supra note 321, at 40.
326. Id.
327. Id. See also Proceedings of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation
of Children, Report of The Working Group on the Judicial Role, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1389, 1392
n.18 (1996) ("Many members of the Group, including the three members of the judiciary, believed
that an appointment process that relieves judges of the responsibility for selecting and monitoring
attorneys may be an appropriate step in assuring high quality representation for children.").
328. See supra text accompanying notes 208-210.
329. Sinden, supra note 302, at 379-80. See also infra, § 111D. . (examining the importance of
full and accurate information in dependency court).
330. Sinden, supra note 302, at 380.
331. Id. at 353.
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ate especially to pressure parents to cooperate. A non-cooperating parent
already accused of neglect or abuse, risks being accused of harming his
or her child a second time.332 Cooperation in these situations, says Sin-
den, is "frequently just a code word for the parent doing whatever the
social worker tells" the parent to do, if that parent wants to be reunited
with his or her child.3 3 This pressure to cooperate can also generate un-
reliable facts on which the court might base its decision.
It is the convergence in dependency court of all of these factors -
the imbalance of power, the emotionally charged issues that are before
the court, the conformity and cooperation required of all participants, and
the informality of the proceedings - that defines the culture of depend-
ency court. The stakes are high in dependency cases, and the issues -
child rearing, child abuse, child neglect - are particularly susceptible to
prejudices. When possible harm to a child is the issue, the temptation to
"cut comers" in order to reach the outcome one wants to reach is great.3
As Sinden so succinctly points out, this combination of factors is de-
signed to produce inaccurate information:
[Slince Miranda v. Arizona, we have recognized that informality in
the context of the power imbalance that exists when the state elicits
information from an individual under a palpable threat of a substan-
tial deprivation of liberty (there, physical restraint - here, removal of
child) is a recipe for coercion and that such coercion can actually re-
sult in inaccurate information being elicited.335
Each act of conformity and cooperation in a child's dependency pro-
ceedings - every agreement of non-aggression - runs the risk of hurting a
child whose best interest needs someone at that particular moment not to
conform, not to cooperate, not to operate on instinct or prejudice, but to
find the facts and to "make waves. 336
Thus, the proceeding to keep in mind as we look at the function of
open or closed dependency hearings is a proceeding about a child the
government believes is abused or neglected; it can separate the child
from his or her parents; it takes place in a grossly overburdened and un-
der funded system that resides at the bottom of the judicial hierarchy; it
is one of an overwhelming number of cases with complex issues; and it
332. Id. at 353-54.
333. Id. at 354. See also Sokol, supra note 28, at 914, n.233 (arguing that dependency cases
often place parents in the awkward position of being required to admit wrongdoing in order to be
"acquitted").
334. Sinden, supra note 302, at 380.
335. Id. at 381 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
336. Shink, supra note 321, at 40. See also Proceedings of the Conference on Ethical Issues in
the Legal Representation of Children, Report of The Working Group on the Judicial Role, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1389, 1392 n.18 (1996) (discussing the Work Group's process of selecting
attorneys to represent children).
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is resolved in an informal environment in which there is great pressure to
"not make waves." And, it takes place in a system that was charged with
protecting Tavelle, Brianna, Kayla, Ashley, and Larry. The question is,
what function would public access to this proceeding serve?
D. The Value of Access to Dependency Court
Even if history yielded a stronger judgment about the confidentiality
of dependency proceedings, the functional role of access today must be
closely scrutinized. Historical judgments yield the judgment of the past,
not the present. The function of closed dependency proceedings is
largely defended as being in the best interest of the children whom the
court is to protect, and the historical origins link the practice to that pur-
pose. The seemingly dismal state of the dependency court system today,
however, raises the question of "how?" How exactly does presumptively
closing dependency hearings serve the best interest of the children?
Dependency court is charged with the responsibility of protecting
children from abuse and neglect; to that end, dependency court is ac-
corded the power of disrupting and severing the parent-child relationship.
Such responsibility should be carefully discharged and such power
should be carefully exercised; the consequences of the courts' actions
will likely have significant and irrevocable consequences for the children
and their parents.
The best interest of the children would first seem to demand that the
court be designed to encourage the fullest and most accurate information
about the important issues before it. Further, to operate in the best inter-
est of the children, the court also needs the confidence and support of the
public. Closed hearings discourage full and accurate information and
closed hearings fail to provide to the public information needed for the
public's confidence and support. It is "the sure knowledge that anyone is
free to attend [a trial that] gives assurance that established procedures are
being followed and that deviations will become known.,, 337 A closed
hearing can sometimes serve the best interest of a child, but presump-
tively closed hearings do not serve the best interest of children.338
1. Full and Accurate Information
Full and accurate information about the matters before dependency
court ought to be a major factor in determining how dependency court
will operate. "No decisions have a more profound impact on the daily
lives, emotional well-being, and safety of litigants than those made every
337. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984).
338. Richard D. Hendrickson, Media Access to Juvenile Courts: An Update, 44 (No. 3) Juv. &
FAM. CT. J. 27, 40 (1993).
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day in family courts. '39 Dependency court factual questions are also
"among the most difficult... and most sensitive [questions] litigated in
American courtrooms., 340 An open courtroom has long been recognized
as one of the most important means of enhancing the reliability of judi-
cial evidence and should help to make more accountable those who tes-
tify or otherwise provide evidence in dependency proceedings. The pub-
lic scrutiny of open proceedings can further encourage accurate and reli-
able evidence in dependency proceedings by countering the culture of
informality and familiarity of current proceedings. Finally, public scru-
tiny should encourage dependency court decisions based on reliable evi-
dence, and discourage decisions based on prejudice, bias and good inten-
tions - all of which are more likely to prosper behind closed doors.
Dependency court proceedings are judicial proceedings. The court
engages in fact-finding and makes decisions based on those findings.
One premise of our judicial system is the belief that justice emerges from
full and truthful testimony,34 and it has long been recognized that open
courtrooms help ensure the reliability of the testimony offered and thus
the accuracy of the fact-finding. 34' A courtroom audience who knows the
truth can discourage perjury and encourage full and complete testimony.
The same audience might also realize they have additional information to
share that might be helpful.343
While dependency proceedings may have more than the normal
share of specific situations that require private testimony, such as when a
child is testifying about sexual abuse, for example, dependency pro-
ceedings are still court proceedings. There is no general reason to except
them from the rationale that applies to testimony in all other court pro-
ceedings. Children testifying about sensitive matters can be dealt with in
the way other courts deal with it - using the court's discretion on a case
by case basis to determine if the testimony should be taken in private. 3"
Further, inaccurate and unreliable evidence that may also result
from the culture of informality and familiarity in dependency court can
339. Catherine J. Ross, Unified Family Courts: Good Sense, Good Justice, 35 TRIAL 30, 30
(1999).
340. Sokol, supra note 28, at 913.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59. See also Sokol, supra note 28, at 913
(examining dependency court fact finding).
342. Gofen, supra note 13, at 878 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596,
606 (1982)). "As noted in Globe Newspaper, public presence at trials aids accurate fact-finding." See
also Sokol, supra note 28, at 913 (examining dependency court fact finding).
343. Karla G. Sanchez, Barring the Media From the Courtroom in Child Abuse Cases: Who
Should Prevail?, 46 BuFF. L. REV. 217, 224-25 (1998). See also Brelsford & Myers, supra note 3, at
15-16 (examining mandatory closure and conditional closure of juvenile proceedings); Gofen, supra
note 13, at 864 (discussing the lower court recognition of the First Amendment right of access to
dependency proceedings).
344. Sokol, supra note 28, at 914.
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be countered somewhat with public access.345 While informality was
central to the original vision of juvenile court, and while both familiarity
and informality can and likely do contribute to some beneficial outcomes
in dependency court, an open courtroom can provide a check to their
possible negative effects. "Several courts acknowledge that juvenile
cases exhibit far more procedural errors than do comparable adult cases
and suggest that confidential proceedings and the absence of counsel
may foster a judicial casualness toward the law that visibility and appel-
late accountability might constrain. '4 6 This state of affairs seems par-
ticularly troubling when it concerns cases as critical as dependency pro-
ceedings. Amy Sinden emphasizes some of the benefits of both formality
and formal rules in courtroom hearings:
The formal rules that govern trial procedure also help to assure accu-
racy. Witnesses testify under oath under threat of penalty for perjury.
The judge excludes unreliable evidence, like hearsay, as well as evi-
dence likely to cause prejudice. The requirement that judges state the
basis for their decisions helps to ensure that decisions are based on a
rational view of the evidence and not on prejudice or bias. Numerous
rules governing judges' conduct in adversarial proceedings encourage
impartiality and the appearance of impartiality. Thus, judges sit
higher than and at some distance from the parties, and usually address
only the lawyers. When they do address the parties directly they do so
formally and on the record. And they do not communicate with one
party out of the presence of the other party. -4'
Open hearings would not preclude informality in dependency pro-
ceedings, but the openness should operate to minimize procedural errors
resulting from that informality. It should similarly help prevent actions
and decisions based on bias or prejudices, and abuses,348 some of which
are aided by the culture of dependency court.
As discussed earlier, the process and dynamics of dependency court
create a significant imbalance of power between the family and the gov-
ernment. The informality and clubbiness, the fact that a child's health
and safety are at issue, and the significant discretion accorded the court
can skew the proceedings to result in the resolution that the government
345. See supra, text accompanying notes 57-59. See also Sokol, supra note 28, at 918 (arguing
that public access would heighten procedural regularity in dependency cases).
346. Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of When
Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1346 n.290
(1989) (citing RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 38 (Alaska 1971); In re Dino. 359 So. 2d 586, 597 (La.
1978)).
347. Sinden, supra note 302, at 379-80.
348. Jan L. Trasen, Privacy v. Public Access to Juvenile Court Proceedings: Do Closed
Hearings Protect the Child or the System?. 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 359, 379 (1995); Dienes,
supra note 3, at 7; Erin M. Smith, In a Child's Best Interest: Juvenile Status Offenders Deserve
Procedural Due Process, 10 LAW & INEQ. J. 253, 260 (1992); Gofen, supra note 13. at 877.
2001]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
favors. 349 Because dependency courts are charged with making major
decisions about children's lives, the potential for misuse of power is
great.
In addition, the subject matter in dependency court requires judges
to exercise a great deal of discretion.350 Standards are vague and judges
must ultimately decide where and with whom a child will do best. Solu-
tions must often be fashioned around: 1) parents who love a child, but do
not know how to care for that child; 2) support services that are assumed
to exist, but that do not - because the resources are not there; and 3) a
foster system that is overloaded and inadequate. Because of the overload
on the system, judges must often make their decisions with hurried
hearings and incomplete information. Prejudices or biases are more
likely to be called upon when reliable information is lacking and are es-
pecially called on in such an "emotionally-charged arena" like depend-
ency court. The safety of a child is at stake and if cutting comers - pro-
cedural comers and evidentiary comers - will keep a child'from what the
judge suspects is a dangerous situation, cutting comers is likely to be
done.352
Public access can check the shortcuts and abuses that stem from
these probably good-intentioned impulses. Indeed, the inappropriateness
of many of these actions may not be visible to the daily participants in
dependency court. The implicit agreements fostered by the familiarity in
juvenile dependency court, for example, those which discourage partici-
pants from "making waves," and challenging the decisions or actions of
colleagues, may be so much a part of the culture of the court that the
regular participants simply fail to see them. It sometimes takes the out-
side view, someone to say "but why do you do that?" before insiders can
see practices that need to be reformed. Thus, open hearings would work
to create self-awareness in a system that may have become so closed that
it has lost the ability to see some of its own faults. Open hearings would
give insiders a fresh view, not only of the court, its personnel, and its
practices, but of the employees of the social services agency, all of whom
"wield vast 'authority on the State's behalf."' 353
349. Abuse can first result from governmental oppression. Formality not only aids in accurate
fact finding, but it also helps to "prevent ... governmental oppression." See Smith, supra note 348,
at 260.
350. Sokol, supra note 28, at 916.
351. Id. at916.
352. Id. at 917. See generally Sinden, supra note 302, at 380-81 (arguing that the evidentiary
constraints and protections against bias and prejudice provided by formality are important in the
child welfare context).
353. Brelsford & Myers, supra note 3, at 17 (quoting Kahn v. Bower, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1599,
1613 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)). See also Sokol, supra note 28, at 917-18 (arguing that public access
would heighten procedural regularity in dependency cases).
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Finally, without public scrutiny, court personnel can intentionally
hide or explicitly agree to ignore shortcuts they might feel are needed for
the system to produce what they perceive as the needed result3 4 Almost
all persons are a bit more conscientious about not rounding the edges of
their performances if their actions are open to scrutiny by others.355 Criti-
cal decisions about a child's future must not be the result of bias, preju-
dice or "instinct." Open hearings provide an accountability that can help
prevent this.356
2. Educate and Inform the Public
A court charged with serving the best interest of abused and ne-
glected children also needs the confidence and support of the public.
"People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institu-
tions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from
observing., 37 For the dependency system to have the support of the pub-
lic, the public must either believe the system is functioning properly or
understand what is necessary for reform. In either event, the public needs
access to dependency proceedings. Further, the "public" includes those
who appear before the court. Parents, children, foster parents and other
affected individuals need to know about the court that decides matters so
important and central to their lives.
Again, the dependency court system deals with important and criti-
cal issues. The system must have the support and confidence of the pub-
lic. Further, not only is juvenile court a public institution, the public is
also a party to dependency proceedings, alleging through its government
that a child is in need of protection. Thus, the public has a need, but also
a right to know what occurs in its own judicial proceedings. The oppor-
tunity for criticism of government institutions is also particularly valued
in our society.358
The first reason to provide access to dependency court proceedings
is to provide the knowledge necessary for intelligent public discussion
and debate. Public access can let the public know if judges are making
decisions based on what the evidence supports, or on individual biases or
personal beliefs.3 9 Public access can let the public see the choices de-
pendency court judges are too frequently faced with today. Often there is
a choice between an inadequate parent and an inadequate foster care
354. Sokol, supra note 28, at 920-22.
355. See supra text accompanying note 57; Sokol, supra note 28, at 918.
356. See supra text accompanying note 57. While many states give the court the discretion to
open the proceedings to the public or any interested person, this still requires the court to act
affirmatively to bring accountability to the system. Few willingly hold themselves out to public
scrutiny. See Sokol, supra note 28, at 920; Brelsford & Myers, supra note 3, at 14-15.
357. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 567, 572 (1980).
358. Brelsford & Myers, supra note 3, at 14-15.
359. Gofen, supra note 13, at 876-77.
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system.' 6° "If public court business is conducted in private, it becomes
impossible to expose corruption, incompetence, inefficiency, prejudice,
and favoritism.
'36'
Public action can occur if the public can see for itself the inadequa-
cies of the system, such as the need for better facilities; the need for more
staff, better trained staff, better paid staff, and better qualified staff; the
need for daycare subsidies, more healthcare support, more home support
services, and better support for foster families; and the overall need for
substantially more financial resources. The action may be as pointed and
immediate as voting a judge out of office or applying public pressure to
remove a lawyer from court appointments; it may be as broad as de-
manding more funding to attract better personnel, train better personnel,
and retain better personnel. But knowledge is the prerequisite to action,
361and the public first needs access to the system.
Further, if the public sees a court treating the issues fully and the
parties fairly, and making the best choices under the circumstances, the
public will be less likely to blame the court when tragic events occur. 161
The outrage at a child's death might offend less and motivate more if the
public understood the limited resources with which the court must func-
tion. 6,
It is ongoing daily access and first hand information that is needed
to motivate, and ultimately support a public call for action and reform.
The current limited access to dependency court information lets the pub-
lic hear of cases only when there has been a horrible result - when a
child subject to the jurisdiction of dependency court is found terribly
abused or dead. The community response is often a short-lived outrage
over the "mistake" made in that particular case. Community members
simply do not have enough information for a more constructive and long-
term response. "A result considered untoward may undermine public
confidence, and where the trial has been concealed from public view an
unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that the system at best has
failed and at worst has been corrupted. 365 If, however, the public could
see the daily inadequacies of the system - the daily mistakes, and the
daily tragic circumstances of smaller cases needing a day care voucher,
360. "Dependency court factual questions are among the most difficult, and most sensitive
[questions] litigated in American courtrooms." Sokol, supra note 28, at 913. See also In re the
Welfare of R.L.K., 269 N.W.2d 367, 368 (Minn. 1978) ("'The public has a right to know how this
Court conducts its business, especially in a Court having as much power as this one."').
361. Estate of Hearst v. Lubinski, 67 Cal. App. 3d 777, 784 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
362. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 35-40 (Alaska 1971); In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 597 (La.
1978) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Fernandez, 712 So.2d 485 (La. 1998)). See also
Gofen, supra note 13, at 875-78; Trasen, supra note 348, at 381.
363. Sanchez, supra note 343, at 225-26, 226 n.49.
364. Sokol, supra note 28, at 926.
365. Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 555,571 (1980).
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public transportation vouchers to obtain medical care, weekly home
nurse visits, or good and accessible counseling services - perhaps the
public could respond in a more meaningful and lasting way.
A trial court judge in Oregon recognized the difference between the
public knowing about one case with a horrific ending and the public un-
derstanding the repeated nature of the daily shortcomings of the system.
The trial court ordered specific treatment for a troubled thirteen-year-old
girl over the objection of the state, which argued that the Children's
Services Division did not have the funds to pay for the court-ordered
treatment. The trial court judge explained why he admitted the press
(with some restrictions) to a trial involving an adolescent girl with a sen-
sitive history of sexual abuse and other troubles:
[Tihe Court knows from its own experience this [case] is not an iso-
lated incident where this particular issue has been involved, and the
Court feels that one of the reasons we have this problem is because
the people of the State of Oregon and, specifically, members of the
Legislature, are not really aware of the magnitude of the problem; and
I believe it is the function of the press as well as the function of all of
us to see that the people of this state, and, particularly, members of
the Legislature, are confronted with the grave reality and stark reality
of children in need in this state whose needs are not being met now;
and I can't do that, and I think that the press can. Exercising my dis-
cretion under the statute, I have allowed the press to be present.
366
Finally, public access can also facilitate research and scholarly in-
put.367 The problems dependency court must deal with are difficult and
challenging. The easier access to dependency court is, the easier it will
be for others to amass the information and knowledge needed to offer
informed views and proposed solutions.
If, with knowledge, the public judges dependency proceedings to be
fair and effective, then the discussion and debate will end there and the
public will support the institution. If the public judges dependency pro-
ceedings to be less than desired, however, and the resources too limited,
perhaps instead of an outrage defined by anger at and blame on the court,
the public outrage will instead be defined by public debate about how the
system can better protect our children.
366. State ex rel. Juv. Dept. of Multnomah Co. v. L., 546 P.2d 153, 155 n. I(Or. 1976).
[The 13 year old girl] was removed from her parental home when she was 11 years old
after a long and disturbing history of sexual abuse by her stepfather and the child's
rejection by her mother. She was first sexually assaulted when she was five years old.
Since [the Children's Services Division] took custody of the child, she has been placed in
a number of institutional and foster homes and has spent a considerable amount of time in
juvenile detention. During the year and a half preceding the hearing [she] ran away from
these homes at least 15 times and was often picked up in various parts of the state in the
company of older boys and young men.
Id. at 155. See also Hendrickson, supra note 338, at 41.
367. See Sokol, supra note 28, at 927.
2001]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
[Plublic disclosure might assist in drawing attention to the terrible
plight of children in this country and to the ever shrinking resources
allocated to both them and the system which is designed to protect
them .... [T]he press can assist juvenile courts .. by providing the
public with greater knowledge of the child welfare system and the
adequacy, or lack thereof, in (child protective) service delivery sys-
368tems.
With full information over a sustained period of time, the public369 may
well make meaningful contributions to what seems now like a hopeless
task.37°
IV. FUNCTION: IS PUBLIC ACCESS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
CHILDREN IN DEPENDENCY COURT TODAY?
The ultimate function test for dependency court access is whether it
is in the best interest of the children whose futures are decided daily by
the dependency court system. Indeed, best interests of the children are at
the heart of mandatory or presumptive closure of juvenile court, includ-
ing dependency proceedings. Unfortunately, an analytical framework
that pits public access to dependency court against the best interest of
children assumes that, on balance, an open courtroom hurts the interest
of children. This is a false premise. A particular child might benefit from
his or her case being closed to the public, but a standard of closure does
not benefit the system that decides that same child's future. If access is
presumed, however, individual assessment of cases in which closure is
requested can continue to respond to the particular privacy needs of any
child. At the same time, the standard of presumed access will continue to
benefit the judicial system, and thus benefit the children the system
serves. In this way, the best interests of the children are served.
The fatal flaw behind mandatory or presumptive closure in depend-
ency cases is the assumption that closure is generally in the best interest
of all children. 7' Court decisions taking this position correctly review the
history of access, emphasizing the juvenile court's practice of closure
368. Brelsford & Myers, supra note 3, at 14.
369. Gofen, supra note 13, at 878. Just as important as the public at large are the parents,
children, foster parents and others who are subject to the juvenile court institution. If the public is
barred from observing the proceedings, when members of that public are called before the court,
they do not know what they are called before. They are less likely to know what the process is, what
goes on, how it functions, and what is expected of the subject. The disadvantage is all the more
apparent because everyone else - the judges, lawyers, social services, and other court personnel - do
know what is going on. But the public, the parent and the child, whose lives will be greatly affected
by decisions made, are barred from information about the system until they are subject to it. Further,
publicity also gives notice - it lets parents, foster parents and others understand what their
responsibility is to the children they care for.
370. See generally Brelsford & Myers, supra note 3, at 14-17; See also Dienes, supra note 3, at
1, 3-4; Gofen, supra note 13, at 875-76.
371. E.g., Edward A. Sherman Pub. Co. v. Goldberg, 443 A.2d 1252, 1258 (R.I. 1982).
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and therefore its historical judgment that closure is best, but the courts
generally ignore the relatively brief history of juvenile court.' Courts
also appropriately look at the purpose and function of closed juvenile
proceedings, but their analysis too often sounds like a mantra, e.g., "[t]he
interests of the juvenile ... are most often best served by anonymity and
confidentiality." ' The result is that courts too often conclude the best
interests of children require mandatory or presumptive closure in all pro-
ceedings without fully considering the cost such closure brings to the
system of justice that must serve those same children. Thus in Florida,
the supreme court upheld mandatory closure of termination of parental
rights hearings,374 simply noting the historical "overriding interest in,
among other things, protecting the child from stigma, publicity, and em-
barrassment and promoting rehabilitation. 375 In Natural Parents of J.B.,
it was the dissenting opinion that provided a discussion of the "strong
376
policy concerns" supporting open hearings, not the majority .
Certainly there are situations where public access might interfere
with a child's best interest, and where testifying in open court might
traumatize children, or where the fairness of the trial might otherwise be
prejudiced.377 But these situations can be dealt with by closure in any
given case; closure should not be deemed as being in the best interest of
all children at all times. The Supreme Court recognized this in Globe,
when holding a statute unconstitutional because it excluded the public
from trials of specified sexual offenses involving a victim under the age
of eighteen:
[S]afeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor
is a compelling one. But as compelling as that interest is, it does not
justify a mandatory closure rule, for it is clear that the circumstances
of the particular case may affect the significance of the interest .... In
short, [the statute] cannot be viewed as a narrowly tailored means of
accommodating the State's asserted interest: That interest could be
served just as well by requiring the trial court to determine on a case-
by-case basis whether the State's legitimate concern for the well-
being of the minor victim necessitates closure. Among the factors to
be weighed are the minor victim's age, psychological maturity and
372. E.g., San Bernardino County Dept. of Pub. Soc. Serv. v. Super. Ct., 283 Cal. Rptr. 332,
338-39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
373. Edward A. Sherman Pub. Co., 443 A.2d at 1258. See also In the Matter of M.C., 527
N.W.2d 290, 293 (S.D. 1995) (quoting Edward A. Sherman Pub. Co., 443 A.2d at 1258).
374. Natural Parents of J.13. v. Fla. Dept. of Children & Soc. Servs., 780 So.2d 6, 9-11 (Fl.
2001).
375. Natural Parents of J.B. 780 So.2d at 6, 9.
376. Id. at 14-15 (Anstead, J., dissenting, with Pariente, J., concurring in the dissent).
377. In addition to keeping a child from suffering the additional stigma and embarrassment that
can occur with open hearings, closed hearings can better accommodate the informality and social
work approach proponents of juvenile court have traditionally favored, and perhaps the rehabilitation
that must occur afterwards. While the informality and social work aspects of dependency court
produce mixed results, see supra text accompanying notes 208-10, 327-33, there may be reasons
besides stigma, embarrassment and trauma that justify partial or full closure of a hearing.
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understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the victim, and
the interests of parents and relatives .
Similarly, Globe also rejected the other rationale offered for ex-
cluding the press and public from sex-offense trials - "the encourage-
ment of minor victims of sex crimes to come forward and provide accu-
rate testimony.,,3' 9 That assertion, according to Globe, was "speculative
in empirical terms" and "open to serious question as a matter of logic and
common sense."
38 °
Consistent with the Court's opinion in Globe, many courts have
recognized the heavy burden closure bears when weighing these issues in
the context of the First Amendment analysis. The U.S. Supreme Court
has held that the presumption of open public proceedings (for proceed-
ings pertaining to criminal trials) can only be overcome by an "overrid-
ing interest"38' - a "compelling interest,
'3 2 "articulated in findings" 383
"specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the clo-
sure order was properly entered.,,38 The Court further held that the clo-
sure must be "narrowly tailored to serve that interest., 383 Federal circuit
courts considering the issue in civil proceedings have held similarly, 386 as
has the California Supreme Court.3 8 7 The Ohio Supreme Court considered
378. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct. for County of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 607-09 (1982).
379. Globe, 457 U.S. at 609.
380. Id. at 609-10. Kathe Aschenbrenner Pate, Restricting Electronic Media Coverage of Child-
Witnesses: A Proposed Rule, 1993 U. CHL. LEGAL FORUM 347 (1993) (discussing the trauma that
can occur to child witnesses testifying in a public forum and stating that portions of a dependency
proceeding can be closed if circumstances warrant). Further, there is a distinction between a child
being a witness and a child being the subject of the proceeding. Pate, as do many authors, focuses on
child witnesses. Either being a witness or being the subject of a legal proceeding can cause trauma -
trauma that may be exacerbated if the proceeding is subject to public access - but neither warrant a
standard of closure, either mandatory or presumed, of all child dependency proceedings.
381. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980).
382. Globe, 457 U.S. at 607.
383. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 581.
384. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Riverside County, 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984).
385. Globe, 457 U.S. at 606-07.
386. Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1983) ("to limit the public's
access to civil trials there must be a showing that the denial serves an important governmental
interest and that there is no less restrictive way to serve that governmental interest"); Newman v.
Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1983) ("closure is proper only if necessary to achieve a
legitimate purpose"; "less intrusive alternatives must be considered"; and "if closure is warranted,
the restriction on access must be narrowly drawn with only that part of the proceeding as is
necessary closed"). See also Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23
(2d Cir. 1984); In re Iowa Freedom of Information Council, 724 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1983);
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir. 1983).
387. NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Super. Ct., 980 P.2d 337 (Cal. 1999). The California
Court held that the court ordering closure must find that there is an overriding interest supporting
closure and that there is a substantial probability that absent closure, that interest will be prejudiced.
The closure must be narrowly tailored to serve the interest and it must be the least restrictive means
of achieving the overriding interest. NBC Subsidiary, 980 P.2d at 365. The court's holding applied to
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the issue specifically as it relates to dependency court and ruled that the
person seeking closure of a dependency hearing bears the burden of es-
tablishing "(1) there exists a reasonable and substantial basis for believ-
ing that public access could harm the child or endanger the fairness of
the proceeding, and (2) the potential for harm outweighs the benefits of
public access.""3 '
Mandatory or presumptive closure is still the norm in dependency
proceedings,389 however, and "protection of the children" by closure usu-
ally trumps access in cases challenging the constitutionality of closed
juvenile hearings,39 whether they are mandatory or presumptive closure
provisions.
In California, the Court of Appeal was faced with deciding whether
the public had a constitutional right of access to child dependency pro-
ceedings3 9' The court fully discussed the important policy concerns sup-
porting open proceedings. The court found itself "at the crossroad,
3 92
deciding that the function of access (e.g., encouraging accurate fact-
finding, checking judicial abuse) favored opening the proceedings, but
that the historical judgment of America's juvenile court would not grant
access to dependency proceedings.3 93 In the end, the court worried that
finding a constitutional right of access would "mean that the proceeding
constitutionally could not be closed unless the judicially created strict
test for closure is met. . . .With the welfare of minors at stake, we are
reluctant to impose the strict standard for closure required for a First
Amendment right.,
394
Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court, even when holding invalid
mandatory closure of juvenile hearings (on delinquency, deprivation and
unruliness matters), 39' ruled that it was permissible to legislate a pre-
396sumption of closure. Thus, the public or press requesting access must
show that the "state's or juveniles' interest in a closed hearing is overrid-
den by the public's interest in a public hearing., 397 Unfortunately with
such a presumption, most courts will likely agree with the Supreme
"ordinary civil proceedings in general, and not any ... particular proceedings governed by specific
statutes." Id. at 361 n.30. The court thus did not include dependency hearings within its holding. Id.
388. In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 451 (Ohio 1990) (ruling, however, that dependency hearings
had neither a presumption of closure nor access). See also State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co. v.
Geauga Co. Ct., 734 N.E.2d 1214 (Ohio 2000); and State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Lias, 628
N.E.2d 1368 (Ohio 1994) for helpful dicta interpreting In re T.R.
389. See supra note 5.
390. See In re J.S., 438 A.2d 1125, 1127 (Vt. 1981); San Bernardino County Dep't of Pub. Soc.
Servs. v. Super. Ct., 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 343 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
391. See San Bernardino, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
392. Id. at 342.
393. See id.
394. Id. at 343.
395. See Fla. Publ'g Co. v. Morgan, 322 S.E.2d 233, 238 (Ga. 1984).
396. Fla. Publ'g Co.. 322 S.E.2d at 238.
397. Id.
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Court of New Jersey in New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Serv-
ices v. J.B. ,9 that "[t]he factual settings presented in the vast majority of
[child protection] cases involve allegations that warrant closure."3 99
One of the myths that access to dependency court would correct is
the assumption that most dependency cases involve allegations of sexual
and other severe physical abuse. Sexual and physical abuse cases, while
numerically substantial, still constitute a minority of dependency cases.4°°
After looking at various surveys, studies and reports, Diana English con-
cluded that neglect "apparently affects about twice as many children as
do physical and sexual abuse."" Most dependency cases are neglect
cases, children who lack basic emotional and physical care, °2 and most
401neglect is rooted in poverty. While all such cases are tragic, they do not
necessarily involve allegations that would cause sufficient trauma to a
child such that closure would be appropriate.4t Even assuming most sex-
ual and physical abuse cases should be closed to the public, 4°5 along with
some of the neglect cases, a substantial number of cases would still be
heard in open court.
398. 576 A.2d 261 (N.J. 1990). The court said J.B. involved "the rare situation in which the
public's right to attend judicial proceedings is not outweighed by the state's compelling interest in
conducting a private hearing." N.J. Div. of Youth, 576 A.2d at 270.
399. Id. at 269.
400. See English, supra note 33, at 43.
401. Id.
402. See id. at 41 Box 1.
403. See Robert F. Kelly, Family Preservation and Reunification Programs in Child Protective
Cases: Effectiveness, Best Practices, and Implications for Legal Representation, Judicial Practice,
and Public Policy, 34 FAM. L.Q. 359, 389 (2000).
404. Most of the cases in dependency court are indeed tragic. The tragedy of these cases,
however, is the poverty and ignorance in which they are rooted. Most are not cases that suggest
trauma or stigma as a result of public access. For example,
[iun her recent book, Jane Waldfogel asserts that the current foster care population may
be grouped into three categories. First, the most serious category, constituting about 10%
of current caseloads, includes "serious and criminal cases." The second group
encompasses serious cases that do not require criminal justice intervention. The final
group of cases are those in which a child is at a relatively lower risk of serious harm, and
the parents may be willing to work with an agency to secure needed services. Together,
the latter two groups comprise 90% of the caseload. Typically, these cases involve less
serious physical abuse (for example, a single, minor injury such as a bruise or a scratch)
or less severe neglect (such as parental drug or alcohol abuse with no other apparent
protective issues, dirty clothes or a dirty home, lack of supervision of a school-age child,
or missed school or medical appointments). Many of these lower-risk neglect cases are
poverty-related, resulting from inadequate housing or inappropriate child-care
arrangements while a parent works.
Martin Guggenheim, Somebody's Children: Sustaining the Family's Place in Child Welfare Policy,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1716, 1724-25 (2000) (reviewing ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S
CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999)
(quoting JANE WALDFOGEL, THE FUTURE OF CHILD PROTECTION 124 (Harvard University Press
1998)).
405. However, the Supreme Court's caution in Globe applies here: "the measure of the State's
interest lies not in the extent to which minor victims are injured by testifying, but rather in the
incremental injury suffered by testifying in the presence of the press and the general public." Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 609 n.19 (1982).
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For this to happen, however, the standard of access must incorporate
the value of the open courtroom. Only with a standard that recognizes
this value, and thus assumes access, will dependency proceedings stand
to benefit from that access and thus better serve the interests of the chil-
dren and other litigants before the court.
Trauma, stigma, embarrassment, and similar concerns for children
in dependency court can all be addressed on a case-by-case basis. 16
However, concerns about obtaining reliable and accurate information,
about court decisions being based on evidence, about lawyers and judges
being held accountable for their performances, and about a judicial sys-
tem earning the confidence of the public - these are concerns resulting
from the "particular government process" of dependency court. These
concerns cannot effectively be addressed in a closed courtroom; they
must be addressed systemically by legislating public access back into the
juvenile dependency system. If a party wishes to bar the public from a
particular hearing, and there is a sufficient reason to do so, that party can
request closure. Because the system and thus the children should benefit
substantially from public access, however, the reason offered for closure
must also be substantial. "Closed proceedings ... must be rare and only
for cause shown that outweighs the value of openness.''°7
The type of harm that must be established and the probability of its
occurrence with an open trial needs to be that which can overshadow the
value open proceedings bring. It could be the Supreme Court's standard
in criminal proceedings: "an overriding interest based on findings that
closure is essential to preserve higher values and ... narrowly tailored to
serve that interest."' 8 It could be "reasonable likelihood of substantial
prejudice;"409 "substantial probability " of substantial prejudice;4 10 or a
"realistic likelihood of prejudice to a fair trial."" It could meet the Ohio
Supreme Court's "reasonable and substantial basis" that the child could
be harmed or the fairness of the proceeding endangered.4 2 In any event,
the harm and the probability of it occurring must outweigh the benefits of
public access,413 "one of the essential qualities of a court of justice.,
14
V. CONCLUSION
"[T]he paramount question," said Judge Elaine Slobod in her Or-
ange County, New York Family courtroom in 1988, "is whether the par-
406. See Globe, 457 U.S. at 607-09.
407. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Sup. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984).
408. Press-Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. at 510.
409. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 14 (1986).
410. Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 14.
411. State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641,654 (N.J. 1983).
412. See In re T.R, 556 N.E.2d 439, 451 (Ohio 1990).
413. SeelnreT.R., 556N.E.2dat451.
414. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 555, 567 (1980) (quoting Daubney v.
Cooper, 109 Eng. Rep. 438, 440 (K.B. 1829)).
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ties and children are better served by retaining the veil of confidentiality
that covered the Family Court from its inception or by lifting that veil
and laying bare the breadth of society's ills which lie beneath. 4 5 Access
will lay bare the state of dependency court and access can bring reform
to the court. Presumptive access can better serve the children and others
in dependency court than can closure. It may be, as the New Jersey Su-
preme Court posited, that "[i]t will be the unusual case in which a factual
context that poses no danger of trauma or embarrassment to the child
coincides with the general public's interest in following the proceed-
ings."' 6 But I believe otherwise. With daily access presumed in depend-
ency courts across the nation, I believe the public will follow the pro-
ceedings. I believe access will work as it was intended to work and as it
has worked in courts for centuries. I believe it will - perhaps slowly -
bring reform to dependency court.
For some time now, legislatures and courts have "retain[ed] the
veil ' 417 of closure. Their answer to the paramount question Judge Slobod
presented has left us with a dependency system that is in crisis and fail-
ing many of our children.48 My argument is that public access can help;
only access and time will tell us if I am correct. But "[t]he only way one
can fully comprehend the realities with which the Family Court deals is
to be here to see what is presented on a daily basis. 41 9 I have sat in de-
pendency court as an observer, and I have participated in dependency
court as a CASA. I have seen judges and lawyers and others do excep-
tional jobs with the resources they had, but the resources were not suffi-
cient. I have also seen judges and lawyers who needed to do more than
they were doing, even with the inadequate resources they had. Access
gives hope for reform, whereas now there is little. I believe the children
who will be in dependency court tomorrow should have that hope.
415. In re: S Children, 532 N.Y.S.2d 192, 198 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1988).
416. J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. J.B., 576 A.2d 261, 269 (N.J. 1990).
417. In re: S Children, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
418. See supra text accompanying footnotes 14-29.
419. In re: S Children, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
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